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A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant may 
see farther than the giant himself.
Didacus Stella, quoted by Robert Burton 
Anatomy of Melancholy, 1621
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and Kirby Gilliland, have my appreciation. Special grati­
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provided nourishment, and to George Letchworth who, as friend 
and chairman, provided assistance and encouragement suffi­
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and considerable patience, and Elizabeth for her encourage­
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beyond their limited years. And I am especially grateful 
to Andrea for her facility with the calculator during the 
early hours of the morning.
All these shared with me this labor. There is one 
other to whom my debt is enormous. It is to my husband,
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Locus of Control, Degree of Social Cueing, and 
Memory Support in Concept Attainment
One fundamental difference between behavioral and 
cognitive approaches to instruction has been the emphasis 
accorded to internal, mediational variables in the learning 
process. Yet concern with the cognitive mediation of overt 
behavior is evidenced in the social learning theory liter­
ature (Bandura, 1965; Rotter, Chance & Phares, 1972).
Given that cognitive and other psychological processes are 
central factors in learning, a crucial question is raised: 
How is the effectiveness of instruction influenced by 
internal processes?
The investigation of cognitive and psychological 
variables in an instructional setting demands an attribute- 
treatment interaction approach to illuminate the complex 
interactions between individual differences and their asso­
ciated internal processes, instructional conditions, and 
task demands. Three variables that seem especially rele­
vant to this approach are locus of control, degree of
social cueing in the instructional process, and the sup­
plantation of memory processes.
Locus of Control
Locus of control is a mediational construct defined 
within the framework of Rotter's social learning theory as 
"a generalized expectancy regarding the degree to which a 
person's own behavior is seen to be the controlling factor 
in securing reinforcements" (Pines, 1973, p. 262). 
Individuals at the internal end of the locus of control 
continuum believe that the reinforcements they receive are 
primarily contingent upon their efforts, abilities, or char­
acteristics. Externals tend to attribute the control of 
reinforcements to "luck, chance, fate, as under the control 
of powerful others" (Rotter, 1975, p. 276). Discussions 
of the internal versus external control dimension are often 
marked by a judgmental tone, with internality and its con­
comitant goal-directed behavior being highly valued. This 
view of locus of control as a personality trait is rejected 
by Rotter who argues against the use of the construct in 
terms of a typology, and favors an interpretation of locus 
of control as an individual difference which may be of con­
siderable import in certain situational contexts (Rotter, 
Chance, & Phares, 1972).
Locus of Control and Cognitive Activity
Extensive research as reviewed by Rotter (1966) and 
others (Joe, 1971; Lefcourt, 1972) suggests a relationship
between locus of control and cognitive activity, inde­
pendent of the effects of intelligence and other general 
abilities. The locus of control construct suggests that 
internal individuals would be more alert and persistent in 
their encounters with information than externals. Numerous 
studies have verified their superiority in terms of infor­
mation-seeking behavior (Seeman & Evans, 1962), attentive­
ness (Julian & Katz, 1968; Lefcourt, Lewis & Silverman,
1968), and covert organization of learning material (Wolk 
& DuCette, 1974; Pines, 1973).
Several investigators have concluded that internals 
make greater use of opportunities to seek and process 
information (Davis & Phares, 1967; Lefcourt & Wine, 1969; 
Phares, 1968) while externals are more influenced by the 
presence of social cues (Pines, 1973; Pines & Julian, 1972; 
Strickland, 1970). Pines (1973) suggests that externality 
is associated with a disposition toward information derived 
from social sources. On this basis, one would predict 
that instructional formats which provide social cueing would 
enhance the saliency of information for learners having 
external control orientations, while the performance of 
internals would be relatively unaffected or even impeded 
by the addition of social cueing.
Memory and covert organization of verbal material was 
studied by Pines (1973) in a test of the hypothesis that 
internals would exhibit greater retention and organization
as a function of successive encounters with the learning 
material and of time available for recall. Finding support 
for this hypothesis. Pines posits that internals are better 
able to retrieve information from memory, or perhaps more 
willing to expend the necessary effort for retrieval.
Results from another area of investigation, that of 
self-evaluation and self-reinforcement, suggest a possible 
mechanism which might explain the rather consistent findings 
that externals are less proficient in the use of cognitive 
processes. Bellack (1972) investigated differential self­
reinforcement behavior and found support for his hypothesis 
that externals, while utilizing the same evaluative criteria, 
demonstrated consistently lower self-evaluations, leading 
to fewer self-reinforcements. Bellack suggests that 
externals do not trust their own efforts and judgments and 
are dependent upon the input of others for the evaluation of 
their behavior. This notion is akin to Bruner, Goodnow, and 
Austin's (1956) identification of one type of "strategy 
error" in concept learning which they describe as a sys­
tematic response tendency leading the individual to indis­
criminately treat cues as probabilistic. One aim of the 
present study is to assess the effect of locus of control 
on organization and memory processes, hypothesizing that 
the external, in the absence of social information, would 
require additional presentation of information before 
committing it to storage in memory.
The first general hypothesis was that individuals with 
an external locus of control are limited in their learning 
by a preference for social sources of information. This 
hypothesis is based on the assumption that different con­
trol orientations are associated with different dispositions 
toward information depending upon the nature of its source, 
with externals responsive primarily to information contain­
ing social cues and internals utilizing all relevant in­
formation regardless of its source. It is expected, 
however, that extensive social cueing could present a dis- 
tractive condition for internals, resulting in decreased 
performance.
A second general hypothesis is that externals are de­
ficient in their ability to remember and organize informa­
tion. This suggests that the external, in the absence of 
social cues, would tend to discount the value of incoming 
information and, consequently, would require additional 
instances of that information before committing it to memory. 
The provision of external aids to memory, i.e., memory 
support, is expected to improve the performance of externals, 
while not affecting or even impeding the performance of in­
ternals .
This study was designed to address the question; Does 
a learner's locus of control interact with the degree of 
social cueing in instruction and with the supplantation of 
memory processes to produce differential performance on a




All subjects were volunteers from elective nursing 
courses at a large southwestern university. The Rotter 
Internal-External Control Scale was administered to 52 
students at the first class meeting, following an explana­
tion by the experimenter that she was seeking subjects for 
a study of how instructional strategies might be optimized 
for the individual learner. The I-E Scale was again admin­
istered upon the subject's arrival for the experimental 
session as a control for statistical regression. Forty-eight 
subjects were selected; this sample was comprised of 42 
females and 6 males, ranging in age from 18 to 43. On the 
basis of a median split using the scores resulting from the 
second administration, 24 subjects were assigned to an in­
ternal subgroup (M=4.29, SD=1.91) and 24 to an external sub­
group (M=11.79, SD-2.42). Scores ranged from 1 to 17 with 
a median of 8.0, a mean of 8.04, and a standard deviation 
of 3.89. Assignment to treatment conditions within each 
locus of control group was randomized.
Task
The experimental task used was a conj unctive concept 
attainment task requiring the use of memory to retain in- 
mation about both criterial and noncriterial attributes
and the ability to make inferences and hypotheses correctly 
from the comparison of examples and nonexamples of the con­
cept. The experimental task was administered via a micro­
computer which presented the stimulus items and elicited 
subject responses, using a game-like format.
The task itself was an adaptation of a task described 
by Wickelgren and Cohen (1962) in their study of the use of 
artificial memory. The task is to identify the correct 
criterial attributes, and thereby the concept rule, follow­
ing the presentation of examples and nonexamples of the 
concept, in as few trials as possible. The decision to 
adapt the task devised by Wickelgren and Cohen, which used 
eight-digit numbers as stimulus items, followed a pilot 
study in which it was noted that many subjects expressed 
"number anxiety" and many attempted arithmetical, rather 
than symbolic, operations with the stimulus items. The 
choice of the microcomputer as a delivery system offered 
advantages in terms of making the task more enjoyable and 
in facilitating data collection.
In the present study, stimulus items consisted of two 
rows of colored dots, each containing eight dots with four 
places comprising the criterial attributes of the concept. 
Each of the eight places is a stimulus dimension with ten 
possible color values, but defined so that only one value 
in those places designated as criterial attributes could be 
part of the concept. The concept used was blue in Place 2,
pink in Place 4, green in Place 5, and blue in Place 8. The 
presentation schedule of examples was designed to allow op­
timal inference from a comparison of the bottom row of dots 
with the top row, an example of the concept which remained 
unchanged throughout all trials. The lower row was clearly 
designated as being either an example (positive instance) or 
a nonexample (negative instance) of the concept. The sub­
ject's task was to discover how many places, which places, 
and what colors in these places defined the concept. The 
subject was instructed to indicate hypotheses and inferences 
during each trial. The schedule of presentation was deter­
mined in advance and was the same for all subjects. Since 
the concept is attainable in nine trials, the remaining 
eleven trials were comprised of repeat presentations of the 
instances given in the first trials. Since all presentations 
involved rows differing in only one place, the subject's 
optimal response was to infer that the changed place between 
an example and a nonexample must be a criterial attribute 
and that the changed place between two examples of the con­
cept cannot be a criterial attribute. Forming hypotheses, 
or provisional judgments, in these situations constitutes an 
inefficient concept attainment strategy. The number of pre­
sentations necessary before a subject will convert former 
hypotheses to inferences constitutes a reflection of trust 
in one's own judgment of the information provided.
Procedure
The procedure was designed as a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial 
design (Locus of Control x Social Cueing x Memory Support) 
conducted in two stages. The first stage consisted of the 
provision of different instructional models designed to 
teach the subject an efficient concept attainment strategy 
and to instruct the subject in the conduct of the experi­
mental task. Models differed in the extent to which they 
provided social cueing, with a seven page paper containing 
minimal social cues used as an informational model and a 
twelve minute videotape of a "live" subject learning the 
process serving as the social model. Instructional materials 
were equated in regard to the level of terminology, average 
length of viewing/reading time, and amount of preprocessing 
(preorganization) of information, but varied in terms of 
social content such as friendly remarks and praise.
Following exposure to the instructional model, the 
subject was seated at a table in a small room, facing a 
television screen. The table contained a microcomputer 
which resembles an electric typewriter. The subject was 
shown how to use the computer's keyboard and rotary hand 
control for entering responses and told to summon the ex­
perimenter upon completion. After advancing the computer 
to the first presentation of stimulus items (Trial 1), the 
experimenter retired to an adjoining room. Stimulus items 
were presented by the computer and displayed on the tele­
vision screen, automatically advancing to the next trial
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following the subject's response. Timing was therefore 
controlled by the subject.
The subject was required to respond in the following 
sequence for each trial:
1. Following comparison of the two rows of dots pre­
sented on the screen, to register the place selected as 
either a criterial or noncriterial attribute by rotating 
the dial on the hand control and depressing a button; or, 
alternately, to press P on the keyboard to pass to a new 
trial.
2. To type responses (Y or N) to these questions which 
appeared on the screen in the following order— "Is It Part 
Of The Rule? Y or N"; i.e., is the dot selected a criterial 
attribute? "Are You Sure? Y or N"; and, "Are You Ready To 
Guess The Rule? Y or N"; i.e. the total rule, all the 
criterial attributes.
3. When ready to guess the rule, to enter each part of 
the rule separately by using the hand control as before. If 
the rule was correctly guessed, the subject received a dis­
play reading "YOU GOT IT!II I!!II I!" If incorrect, the sub­
ject was presented with the next trial and the "game" con­
tinued. Up to twenty separate trials were presented using 
this procedure.
Half of the subjects in each group were provided with 
a visual display of their reasoning on previous trials dur­
ing the task. This record, or memory support, was initially 
presented on the television screen as two sets of white dots.
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After the subject indicated whether or not a given dot in 
the stimulus item was a criterial attribute, the correspond­
ing white dot would either change to the appropriate color, 
if the subject had indicated that it was a criterial attri­
bute, or would disappear from the screen, if selected as a 
noncriterial attribute. This change would appear in the 
row designated by the subject's expressed degree of cer­
tainty, i.e., "SURE" or "NOT SURE." Subjects in the condi­
tion without memory support received presentation of the 
stimulus items only.
Results
On the basis of previous studies reporting the fre­
quency of incorrect usage of information from negative in­
stances in concept attainment tasks (Bruner, et al., 1956; 
Wickelgren & Cohen, 1962), behaviors relating to the use of 
information derived from negative instances were chosen as 
being especially susceptible to change as a result of in­
struction. Five dependent variables reflecting the ability 
to remember, compare, and correctly utilize information 
about criterial attributes were utilized. These included: 
(a) number of trials to solution (overall performance), (b) 
number of inferences for negative instance trials, (c) num­
ber of hypotheses for negative instance trials, (d) number 
of trials with nonutilization of information, and (e) trial 
of first inference regarding negative instance. Since the 
problem is solvable in nine trials, data on the number of 
inferences and hypotheses would be confounded by the sue-
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cessive elimination of early solvers, so these measures were 
applied to the first trials only.
The data, summarized in Table 1, were analyzed using a 
2 x 2 x 2  (locus of control x social cueing x memory support) 
multivariate analysis of variance on the five dependent vari­
ables : trials to solution, inferences, hypotheses, nonutili­
zations and first trial inference. The analysis yielded 
significant effects for the locus of control variable,
F (5, 36) = 3.42, p <.02. Although the remaining main and 
interaction effects did not attain significance, the first 
order interaction between locus of control and the extent of 
social cueing approached significance, F (5, 36) = 2.47,
£ <  .0507.
Univariate analyses revealed main effects for locus of 
control for inferences, F (1, 40) = 4.62, p < .05, and for 
hypotheses, F (1, 40) = 10.74, g^<.01, with internals exhibit­
ing superior performance. An interaction between locus of 
control and the degree of social cueing was evidenced in the 
number of trials to solution, F (1, 40) = 8.48, £< .01.
Visual inspection of graphs (see Figures 15-24, Appendix R) 
based on cell means revealed the predicted superiority, on 
all five measures, for internals under the informational model 
condition with the perfoirmance of externals approaching that 
of internals under the social model condition. Although no 
main effects or first order interactions attained signifi­
cance, results were in the desired direction with the perfor­
mance of internals being relatively unaffected by the pro-
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Each 
Treatment Condition
Treatment Internals Externals
M SD M SD
Variable: Trials to Solution
Social, No Support 16.50 5.82 11.67 4.37
Social, Support 13.67 3.83 12.50 2.95
Informational, No Support 10.50 3.56 17.00 4.00
Informational, Support 12.33 4.76 14.33 4.59
Variable: Number of Inferences
Social, No Support 3.83 1.47 4.50 1.22
Social, Support 4.00 1.26 2.33 1.86
Informational, No Support 4.67 0.52 2.83 2.48
Informational, Support 4.17 1.33 3.17 1.47
Variable: Number of Hypotheses
Social, No Support 1.17 1.47 0.50 1.22
Social, Support 0.67 0.82 2.67 1.86
Informational, No Support 0.33 0.52 2.83 2.32
Informational, Support 0.33 0.52 2.00 1.79
Variable: First Trial Inference
Social, No Support 2.00 2.45 2.17 3.37
Social, Support 1.67 1.03 2.17 1.17
Informational, No Support 1.33 0.82 3.67 3.93
Informational, Support 1.00 0.00 2.83 2.64
Variable : Non--Utilizations
Social, No Support 0.67 0.82 0.00 0.00
Social, Support 0.33 0.52 0.17 0.41
Informational, No Support 0.33 0.52 1.00 2.00
Informational, Support 2.17 2.99 0.17 0.41
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vision of memory support while the performance of externals 
improved. Significant three-way interactions were identified 
for the number of hypotheses, F (1, 40) = 4.35, £<.05, and 
for the number of nonutilizations, F (1, 40) = 4.16, p < .05. 
Inspection of graphs (see Figures 25-29) based on two-way 
interactions for each level of the third variable revealed 
disordinal profiles for internals and externals under the no 
memory support condition, but not under the memory support 
condition. As predicted, the performance of externals was 
inç>roved by the provision of social cueing during instruction 
and memory support during task performance, and the perfor­
mance of internals decreased under these conditions.
To assess the specific contributions of each of the 
independent variables, a series of individual comparisons 
was undertaken. Adjustment of error rate was accomplished 
by the use of Dunn's technique to control the probability 
of a Type II error at the .05 level per hypothesis, result­
ing in an alpha of .025 per comparison.
In order to investigate the hypothesis that the pro­
vision of social cueing in the instructional model would 
benefit the external's performance while interfering with 
the internal's performance, data were collapsed over the 
third dimension to provide a 2 (locus of control) x 2 
(social cueing) design. The prediction that the performance 
of internals would exceed that of externals following an in­
structional presentation low in social cueing (informational 
model) received support in terms of the number of trials to
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solution, F (1, 40) = 5.80, £<.025, and the number of 
hypotheses, F (1, 40) = 12.30, p < .01. Support was not 
obtained, however, for the prediction that the performance 
of externals would exceed that of internals under the in­
structional condition high in social cueing. While differ­
ences between the two groups under the social model condi­
tion failed to achieve significance, inspection of the cell 
means reveals that with the provision of social cueing, the 
performance of externals approaches that of internals.
While the performance of internals generally exceeded 
that of externals without memory support, these differences 
were not found to be significant. The provision of memory 
suppoirt, however, did result in scores favoring externals 
in terms of the number of hypotheses,F (1, 40) = 9.53, £< .01.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to explore the possible 
relationship between locus of control and its associated 
cognitive processes, and the effectiveness of selected in­
structional attributes, namely, the extent of social cueing 
and the provision of memory support to supplant the 
learner's memory processes.
The assumption that individuals who perceive their 
own behavior as the determining factor in securing rein­
forcements would be attentive to information which could 
prove to be of future value has been repeatedly substan­
tiated by others. Of special interest was the assumption 
that for externals, who attribute their reinforcements to
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luck, fate, or other persons, the provision of social cueing 
in instruction would enhance learning through the stimulation 
of attentional or motivational processes. To the extent that 
social cueing functions as "noise" in the instruction message, 
it was predicted that the inclusion of social cueing would 
interfere with the performance of internals.
Results from this study support the notion that in­
clusion of social cueing in the instructional strategy en­
hances the learning of externals, while proving less 
efficacious than information alone for the internal. The ob­
tained pattern of results suggest that, with minimal social 
cueing in the instructional format, the external learner is 
at a disadvantage. These data suggest that social stimuli 
may function as important cues to the external, stimulating 
attentional processes or providing an incentive condition 
for learning. For the internal, however, extensive social 
cueing may provide an undesirable distraction from the in­
formation contained in the instruction. These findings are 
consistent with Rotter's locus of control construct and with 
social learning theory (Rotter, 1966; Bandura, 1965) which 
accords considerable emphasis to the role of cognitive and 
other psychological processes in vicarious learning. In the 
sense that much school learning involves acquisition of in­
formation and skills from models (whether they be presented 
in live, mediated, or abstract verbal formats), an under­
standing of the social and psychological processes which 
govern learning is crucial to the improvement of instruction.
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The second hypothesis predicted that the supplantation 
of memory processes through the use of an external aid to 
memory would compensate for the external's deficient memory 
processes. While the existence of such a deficiency has not 
been studied directly, the results of several studies (Pines, 
1973; Pines & Julian, 1972; WOlk & DuCette, 1974) provide 
suggestive evidence that the external tends, in the absence 
of social validation, to avoid making strong judgments on 
the basis of available information and to have less adequate 
memory than externals on both intentional and incidental 
memory tasks. Current theory and research failed to provide 
substantial guidance concerning the likely effect of memory 
support on the performance of internals, but it was hypothe­
sized that the provision of such support could serve as dis- 
tractive stimuli, interfering with task performance. Limited 
support was found for this notion, with results generally 
suggesting that the provision of memory support neither im­
peded or enhanced the performance of internals. While the 
performance of externals was consistently better under memory 
support conditions, significant effects were identified only 
for the number of hypotheses.
Since significant results would have provided indirect 
evidence of the existence of a deficiency in memory processes 
for externals, the failure to find significant differences 
leaves this question unresolved. Should such a deficiency 
exist, as suggested by the direction of results, one plau­
sible explanation may be found in an analysis of the cogni­
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tive demands involved in the experimental manipulation.
It is not unlikely that an in-depth task analysis might 
reveal that, while simplifying the cognitive demands of the 
original task, the use of such a complex support system may 
have inadvertently introduced new demands of sufficient 
strength to offset the effects of the supplantation pro­
vided. Analysis of significant three-way interactions 
identified for the number of hypotheses and for the number 
of nonutilizations revealed the predicted pattern under the 
memory support condition, but not under the condition in 
which memory support was not available.
Although the present findings provide some support for 
the predicted relationship between locus of control, the de­
gree of social cueing, and the supplantation of memory pro­
cesses in a group of adult learners, the conditions of the 
experiment were not sufficient to allow generalization to 
other populations or other learning tasks. In particular, 
it was noted that the significant differences between in­
ternal and external groups on the first trial of inference 
and nonutilization variables may have been attenuated by the 
use of a game-like format which could conceivably encourage 
subjects to enter responses, even "wild guesses," rather 
than pass to the next round (nonutilization). Inspection of 
individual results indicated that nine subjects made infer­
ences on early trials and then began reverting to hypotheses, 
presumably realizing that the "game" was not as easy as it 
originally appeared.
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It is recommended that in a subsequent study of these 
variables the comparison groups be more highly differ­
entiated in terms of locus of control, perhaps by the use of 
the upper and lower thirds of the distribution rather than 
a median split. That the effectiveness of instructional 
conditions differed for the individuals studied as a function 
of their locus of control implies the relevance of this con­
struct as a learner characteristic having utility for the 
identification of psychological processes involved in learn­
ing as well as for the design and management of instruction.
Summary
This study investigated the hypothesis that the degree 
of social cueing and the supplantation of memory processes 
would differentially affect the performance of learners 
varying in locus of control on a computerized conjunctive 
concept attainment task. Specifically, it was hypothesized 
that instruction involving a high degree of social cueing 
would facilitate the performance of externals and function 
as a distractive condition for the internal learner, result­
ing in decreased performance. It was also hypothesized that 
the external, because of his tendency to avoid strong judg­
ments, would not expend the necessary effort to commit in­
formation to long term memory, and that supplanting memory 
processes by providing an external aid to memory would compen­
sate for this deficiency. The provision of memory support 
was expected to interfere with the performance of internals.
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Forty-eight university nursing students were assigned 
on the basis of their scores on the Rotter Internal-External 
Control Scale to two treatment blocks, corresponding to in­
ternal and external control orientations, and randomly as­
signed in equal number to levels of the independent variables. 
The subjects received instruction in an efficient strategy 
for solving a concept attainment task, presented via a paper 
containing minimal social cueing or a videotape presentation 
of a "live" model which contained numerous social cues.
The subject received a conjunctive concept attainment 
task, designed as a video-game, either with or without the 
provision of memory support. Subjects in the no memory sup­
port condition received a display of the stimulus items only, 
while subjects in the memory support condition received an 
additional display which served as a cumulative record of 
their hypotheses and inferences on previous trials.
Five dependent variables were investigated: number of
trials to solution, number of inferences and hypotheses re­
garding negative instances, first trial of inference regard­
ing a negative instance, and number of nonutilizations. 
Statistical treatment of the data included a 2 (locus of 
control) X  2 (social cueing) x 2 (memory support) multi­
variate analysis of variance, followed by univariate 
factorial analyses and individual comparisons of cell means 
of special interest.
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Predictions concerning the interaction between the 
learner's locus of control and the degree of social cueing 
were supported in terms of a borderline result in the multi­
variate analysis. Univariate analyses indicated that locus 
of control yielded significant effects on the number of in­
ferences and hypotheses, with externals' performance in­
creased and internals' decreased under the social cueing 
condition. Little support was found for the hypothesized 
relationship between locus of control and the provision of 
memory support. As expected, a significant effect for locus 
of control was demonstrated in favor on internals.
Results were interpreted as consistent with social 
learning theory, and as indicating that the locus of control 
variable serves as a learner characteristic of import to 
educators.
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APPENDIX A 
Prospectus
LOCUS OF CONTROL, DEGREE OF SOCIAL CUEING, AND 
MEMORY SUPPORT IN CONCEPT ATTAINMENT
An area of personality theory relevant to school 
learning is the locus of control construct. Locus of con­
trol is a mediational construct defined within the frame­
work of Rotter's socicil learning theory as "a generalized 
expectancy regarding the degree to which a person's own 
behavior is seen to be the controlling factor in security 
reinforcements" (Pines, 1975, p. 262). It has been shown 
to be predictive of learner behavior in a number of varied 
situations and has been studied extensively in regard to 
cognitive activity, social influence, achievement behavior, 
reactions to social stimuli, deferment of gratification, 
response to success and failure, and self-control behavior 
(Joe, 1971; Lefcourt, 1972; Prociuk & Lussier, 1975).
The study of attribute-treatment interactions, i.e., 
the manner in which characteristics of the learner in­
fluence the learning process, is of considerable interest 
to behavioral scientists and educators. This investigation 
focuses upon the interaction between locus of control as a 
learner attribute, the degree of social cueing involved in 
the presentation of an instructionaü. model, and the provi­




While studies of the relationship between locus of 
control and general learning-related behaviors have been 
numerous, there have been few attempts to examine the 
interaction between locus of control and specific instruc­
tional variables and their associated psychological pro­
cesses, using an attribute-treatment approach. Results of 
this investigation could provide information which could 
be useful for the guidance of educational practice. The 
proposed study will attençt to identify those cognitive 
processes required in concept attainment tasks which are 
either interfered with or facilitated by the learner's 
locus of control. Current e:q)lanations of the effect of 
locus of control on these processes are inadequate for 
predictive purposes because they generally fail to specify 
the range of task and cognitive variables to which they 
apply.
Review of the Literature 
The following review will summarize the relevant 
literature in these areas: attribute-treatment inter­
actions, social learning theory, the locus of control con­
struct êuid its relationship to learning-related behaviors, 
instructional models, and concept attainment. 
Attribute-Treatment Interactions
The study of attribute-treatment interactions received 
its greatest impetus from the concern with individualized 
instruction which was prevalent during the 1960's. The
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central questions in this type of applied reseeurch were:
Are different instructional conditions optimal for dif­
ferent learners? If so, how can we best match learners 
and instruction? The investigation of attribute-treatment 
interactions reflected the researcher's attempt to identify 
individucil differences which could then be used to indi­
vidualize instruction, with the ultimate goal of increased 
effectiveness and efficiency in instruction.
The term attribute-treatment interaction has been 
used to describe the expectation that different learners 
will perform optimally under different instructional con­
ditions. The term aptitude-treatment interaction was pre­
viously used, but has been generally discarded in favor of 
the broader conception of learner characteristics implied 
by the term attribute. Attribute refers to any character­
istic of the learner (whether trait, state, aptitude, or 
interest). Treatment refers to the organization of in­
structional materials or procedures. The notion of inter­
action implies an expectation of contrasting responses to 
the treatments by different learners depending upon their 
attributes.
Early efforts to identify learner attributes which 
could profitably be used to individualize instruction were 
generally discouraging. Cronbach and Snow (1969) provided 
one of the most extensive reviews of the field of attribute- 
treatment interaction research and concluded that
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Progress toward the goal of identifying and under­
standing ATI has been slight. . . . One reaction to 
this regrettable state of affairs would be to abandon 
ATI research on the grounds that such effects are 
nonexistent. We urge against this defeatist course.
It is inconceivable to us that humans, differing in 
as many ways as they do, do not differ with respect 
to the educational treatment that fits each one 
best. (p. 139)
Cronbach and Snow note that one of the greatest problems in 
attribute-treatment interaction research is the failure to 
conceptualize the most important dimensions of the charac­
teristics of learners and instruction. While a conceptual 
framework is viewed as a prerequisite for fruitful inter­
actional research, Cronbach and Snow also argue that 
attribute-treatment research, by contributing to the de­
velopment of a matrix of learning situations and learner 
characteristics, should assist in the development of a 
theory of instruction.
Others encourage the use of a third variable, the 
learning task, in interaction research (Hunt, 1975;
Salomon, 1971). Cognitive-functional approaches such as 
these call for an analysis of the sequential psychological 
processes demanded by the learning task and of the cogni­
tive processes required for adequate learning and sub­
sequent performance of the task.
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Salomon (1977) notes that there are at least two ways 
in which instructional strategies can affect relevant men­
tal skills; they can either "call upon the skills" or
"overtly supplant them" (p. 613). Instruction may then be
viewed as preferential (where instructional attributes or 
task requirements are matched to the learner's preferred 
learning style) or consensatory (providing learners with 
the necessary mediators or organizers; i.e., the processes 
in which they are deficient).
Bhetts (1972) suggests that
One of the reasons the previous work with specific
abilities has not seemed to pay off may well be that 
the abilities under consideration in a given experi­
ment had no known or strong inferential relation to 
the specific task the subject was asked to cope with. 
The task-analytic approach should increase the pro­
bability that treatment and attribute variables will 
show significant and replicable interactions.
(p. 276)
The trend toward increasing attention to the analysis 
of task characteristics, specification of learner attri­
butes in terms of required cognitive processes, and the 
development of treatments contrasted in terms of instruc­
tional attributes is evidenced in the recent research 
literature (Hunt, 1975; Meichenbaum, 1977; Pines & Julian, 
1972; Salomon & Cohen, 1977).
31
The construction of a conceptual model, and its implied 
research paradigm, is an indispensable part of any attribute- 
treatment interaction study. Such a paradigm should include:
1. Measurement of the attribute. The initial level of 
the attribute variable must be assessed, by whatever valid 
and reliable means which are available, eind individuals may 
then be assigned to groups on the basis of differences.
2. Selection of the dependent variables. Measures
of overall task performance and mediating process variables 
should be selected on the basis of the theoretical expec­
tation that they are likely to be affected by the learner 
attribute.
3. Selection of the experimental task. The task 
must permit measurement of the dependent variables and 
should yield itself to analysis with respect to its cog­
nitive and psychological demands.
4. Development of contrasting treatments. Instruc­
tional materials and procedures must be designed which 
modify the cognitive processes which are believed to be 
affected by the attribute.
Salomon (1971) suggests that treatments may be con­
trasted on the basis of the way in which they modify 
cognitive processes. Salomon described three common 
approaches: remedial, compensatory, and preferential.
The remedial approach involves the design of treatments 
which lead to the mastery of prerequisite objectives in
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which the learner is deficient, typically through the 
provision of more time or exposure to instruction. In the 
compensatory approach, treatments overtly provide (sup­
plant) the needed cognitive processes for the learner, or 
act to neutralize the debilitating effects of certain psy­
chological traits or states.
Treatments in the preferential approach, however, 
assume that the learner will perform best when working on 
learning activities whose characteristics are congruent or 
compatible with the learner's attributes. Preferential 
treatments are designed to capitalize on the learner's 
proficiency.
5. Determining the effectiveness of treatment. The 
extent to which the effects of the learner attribute vary 
as a function of the instructional treatment is the focus 
of an attribute-treatment interaction study. If the treat­
ments provided are sufficiently strong, disordinal inter­
actions should emerge based on the prediction that the low 
proficiency learner will benefit from treatment, while the 
more proficient learner will experience interference. If 
the expected results emerge, the instructional treatments, 
following further development and research, can be general­
ized and adapted to the requirements for claissroom use.
33
Social Learning Theory
The locus of control construct has been related to a 
variety of theoretical frameworks including Adlerian theory 
of personality with its emphasis on mastery needs (Lefcourt, 
1966), attribution theory (Pines, 1973), achievement motiva­
tion and Reisman's conceptualization of the inner-directed/ 
outer-directed personality types (Rotter, 1966). However, 
the locus of control construct originated from Rotter's 
social learning theory. Consequently, it is most advan­
tageous to examine the concept within this framework.
Social learning theory was developed within the behav- 
iorist tradition in response to what was perceived as its 
feàlure to account for conditions that obted.n in natural­
istic conditions through the rigid "adherence to a rela­
tively narrow range of learning principles and procedures" 
explicable by an operant conditioning model (Bandura, 1965, 
p. 2). Common to cill behavioristic approaches is the notion 
that past experiences determine future behavior— the law of 
effect. In the operant paradigm, as typified by Skinner's 
behaviorism, learning is described as the acquisition of 
new response patterns as the result of differential re­
inforcement of an individual's emitted responses under 
specific stimulus conditions (Skinner, 1957).
Recognizing some of the limitations of this theory in 
explaining the conçlexities of humeui learning outside the 
laboratory setting. Miller and Dollard (1941) proposed a
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theory of social learning and imitation. According to this 
theory, individuals leam to match the behavior of models 
and to generalize these imitative responses to new models, 
different stimulus situations, and in response to different 
motivational states as a result of having been reinforced 
previously for matching behavior. Although this early at­
tempt to bring social learning into the domain of behavioral 
psychology was in memy respects simply an extension of the 
basic operant paradigm, it stimulated the search for broader 
formulations which would explain corçlex social learning 
phenomena such as attitudinal learning, vicarious learning, 
and symbolic learning.
The basic assurâtions of social learning theory as 
outlined by Phares (1976) can be described as follows :
1. The concern of social learning theory is the inter­
action of individuals with their meaningful environments. 
Behavior must be analyzed in terms of situational and per- 
sonological characteristics as well as stimulus conditions, 
responses and reinforcements. The subjective evaluation of 
stimulus properties is an is^ortant determiner of behavior.
2. Personological variables such as general traits 
are viewed as contributors to behavior. Emphasis is placed 
on learned attitudes, expectations, and values.
3. Social learning theory emphasizes the importance of 
situational variables. Behavior must be studied within its 
situational context.
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4. Behavior is motivated, directed toward or away from 
some goal.
5. Finally, the "occurrence of a behavior . . .  is 
determined not only by the nature or inçortance of goals or 
reinforcements but also by the person's anticipation or ex­
pectancy that these goals will occur" (Potter, Chance & 
Phares, 1972, p. 11).
Specifically, social learning theory states that the 
probabili^ of occurrence for any social behavior within an 
individual's response repertoire is a function of the 
expectancy of a given reinforcement following the specific 
response and the value of that reinforcement in the situa­
tion (Rotter, Chance, & Phares, 1972). Reinforcement is 
defined as anything having sin effect on the occurrence, 
direction or kind of behavior. Value is defined as "the 
degree of preference for any reinforcement to occur if the 
possibilities of occurring were all equal" (Rotter, 1954, 
p. 107). Reinforcement value is related to learned needs; 
i.e., those acquired as secondary needs through early asso­
ciation with primary biological needs.
Expectancy, or the "probability held by the individual 
that a particular reinforcement will occur as a function of 
a specific behavior on his part in a specific situation" 
is^lies subjective assessment (Rotter, 1954, p. 107).
Rotter conçares generalized expectancy to Harlow's (1949) 
concept of higher-order learning skills— a set that certain
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types of problems can be solved by a certain approach, a 
propensity to adopt a similar approach across a wide range 
of situations, irrespective of the nature of the specific 
situation or reinforcements involved. Rotter delineates 
between situations which arouse specific expectancies be­
cause the individuel, has had prior experience in highly 
similar situations and novel situations which elicit gener- 
cilized expectancies.
In summary, social learning theory attempts to explain 
the person's selection of specific responses from a larger 
repertoire in predicting behavior in a social setting. Al­
though social learning theory evolved from associationistic 
and instrumental conditioning theories, it encompasses a 
wide range of behavior determinants including personality, 
motivation, and situational context. It was within this 
framework that Julian B. Rotter developed the concept of 
locus of control.
Locus of Control
Although the conceptualization of the locus of control 
construct is generally ascribed to the publication of 
Rotter's monograph on locus of control in 1966, precursors 
of the notion are found in the writings of Harlow in the 
1940's, Piaget in the 1930's, Veblen in the 1890's, and even 
Shakespeare in the seventeenth century. Undoubtedly, 
thoughtful men have pondered the problems of fate, destiny, 
powerlessness, and control throughout the ages. The
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specific stimulus for the development of the locus of con­
trol construct, however, was a patient whom Sotter calls 
Karl S.
The psychotherapy of Karl S. was directed toward the 
goal of developing social skills in which he was deemed de­
ficient. In spite of the fact that his therapy had suc­
ceeded in his developing these skills, which in turn led to 
the desired and expected reinforcements, Karl S. remained 
unhappy. He related that he could not feel better because 
he could not expect such success in the future because he 
believed his previous successes were due to his therapist 
and his good luck, rather than his own efforts.
To reconcile the discrepancy between the clinical evi­
dence presented by Karl S. and the expectation that rein­
forcement should increase the expectancy of future rein­
forcement, Rotter formulated the locus of control construct 
as a specific example of a generalized expectancy. Locus 
of control is described as the degree to which a person be­
lieves in internal or external control of reinforcement, 
whether he believes that what happens to him is dependent 
upon his own behavior cind thus under his own control (in­
ternal orientation) or is contingent upon fate, luck, power­
ful others, etc. (external orientation). Rotter's thesis is 
that locus of control is a personality dimension constitu­
ting an important motivational variable which can be used 
in the prediction of behavior. Rotter (1975) defined locus
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of control as follows:
When a reinforcement is perceived by the siabject as 
following some action of his own but not being contin­
gent upon his action, then, in our culture, it is 
typically perceived as the result of luck, chance, 
fate, as under the control of powerful others, as un­
predictable because of the great complexity of forces 
surrounding him. When the event is interpreted this 
way by an individual, we have labeled this a belief in 
external control. If the person perceives that the 
event is contingent upon his own behavior or his own 
relatively permanent characteristics, we have termed 
this a belief in internal control, (p. 276)
The expectancy in any specific situation is jointly 
determined by the expectancy that a reinforcement will occur 
as a function of previous reinforcement in a highly similar 
situation, and a variety of generalized expectancies, in­
cluding locus of control (Phares, 1976).
Early attempts to assess the validity of the locus of 
control construct took two forms: demonstration of the ex­
perimental induction of situation-specific control expectan­
cies and the development of an instrument which would be 
useful in scaling beliefs or general expectancies concerning 
locus of control; i.e., assessing expectancies on a con­
tinuum. Working at Ohio State University under the direc­
tion of Rotter, Phares developed a crude test of internal-
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external orientation as part of his doctoral dissertation. 
Subsequent revisions and reconstructions based on Phares' 
initial scale eventually resulted in the development of the 
instrument most widely used to assess control expectancy, 
the Rotter I-E Scale.
The earliest published studies of locus of control in­
volved the experimental manipulation of expectancies through 
the use of tasks structured to encourage subjects to believe 
that success was determined either by chance or by skill 
(James & Rotter, 1958; Phares, 1957). In the Phares study 
it was noted that subjects under skill instructions (corres­
ponding to internal orientations) changed expectancies more 
frequently and in the direction predicted by success or 
failure on previous trials. Chcuice (external) instructions 
led to unusual shifts in expectancy similar to the "gambler's 
fallacy," with increased expectancy of success following a 
run of failures. The James and Rotter study revealed that 
under chance instructions, the traditional superiority of 
partial reinforcement for increasing resistance to extinc­
tion was obtained; whereas, under skill conditions no dif­
ference was found between 100% and partial reinforcement. 
James and Rotter explained these findings on the basis of 
subjects' perceptions or attributions of causality. Sub­
jects in the skill conditions persisted in the face of non­
reinforcement, assuming that reinforcement had ceased as a 
result of a deficiency in their skill rather than as a
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result of a change in the rules governing reinforcement.
The publication of Rotter's monograph (1966) stimulated 
a wealth of reseeurch contributing to the further growth of 
Rotter's social learning theory and specifically to an un­
derstanding of the antecedents, correlates, and effects of 
locus of control. Reviews of the literature indicate the 
breadth of application of the locus of control construct in 
areas such as the following : (a) social class and ethnic
group differences, (b) antecedents (familial and social) of 
internal-external attitudes, (c) achievement motivation,
(d) personality correlates, (e) academic achievement,
(f) alcoholism and drug abuse, (g) social influence, (h) in­
terpersonal perception, (i) learning, (j) cognitive stra­
tegies and information processing, (k) measurement of locus 
of control, (1) socio-political activity, and (m) risk- 
taking behavior (Joe, 1971; Lefcourt, 1972; Phares, 1976; 
Prociuk & Lussier, 1975; Rotter, 1966). In an attempt to 
present a summarization of findings germane to the purpose 
of this study, a selective review of the literature will be 
organized around the empirical validation of locus of con­
trol as a personality variable, its relationship to achieve­
ment behavior, and its use as a cognitive variable.
Locus of control as a personality variable. Joe (1971), 
in a review of the literature pertaining to the construct 
validation of locus of control, notes a consistent pattern 
of findings. These findings characterize externals as being
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relatively more anxious, aggressive, dogmatic, and less 
trustful and self-confident than internals, and as having 
lower needs for social approval. Joe cites numerous studies 
indicating the following behavioral correlates of intemal- 
ity: greater initiative and effort in attempts to control
their environment (Phares, 1965; Seeman, 1963; Strickland, 
1965); striving for achievement (Chance, cited in Rotter, 
Chance & Phares, 1972; Coleman, 1966; Crandall, Katkovsky,
& Crandall, 1965); and resistance to subtle manipulation at­
tempts (Strickland, 1970),
Several investigators have successfully predicted 
higher externality in cross-cultural and ethnic group com­
parisons. This sv^ports the theoretical expectation that 
individuals from groups who are restricted by social bar­
riers, or who are influenced by "passive" cultural tradi­
tions, e.g. Hindus, would exhibit highly external expectan­
cies (Baron & Ganz, 1972; Lefcourt & Ladwig, 1965; Strick­
land, 1972).
Locus of control and achievement behavior. Another 
area of relevance to locus of control concerns the relation­
ship between locus of control and achievement behavior. 
Several authors have suggested that the development of an 
internal control orientation might be explained as a phe­
nomenological response to one's own intelligence or achieve­
ment, but Lefcourt (1966) argues against such an interpre­
tation in favor of a view that locus of control may serve as
42
a mediating variable in the "pursuit of achievement."
The locus of control construct suggests a logical 
relationship with achievement behavior— individuals who do 
not believe their efforts and abilities are effective in 
securing reinforcements obviously should be handicapped in 
meeting the long-term demands of achievement-related goals. 
Investigations of this relationship have generally svç>ported 
this view, but not without occasional contradictions which 
suggest that the relationship may not be as straightforward 
as it would seem. James (1965) found intemality related 
to task persistence; Franklin (1963) reported that internal 
high school students spend more time doing homework; and 
other have presented findings supporting the hypothesis 
that intemality is accon^anied by a willingness to defer 
gratification (Bialer, 1961; Mischel, Zeiss & Zeiss, 1974). 
Achievement behavior, as measured by course grades, achieve­
ment test scores, and academic aspirations, has been found 
to be related to intemality in numerous studies (Chance, 
cited in Rotter, Chance & Phares, 1972; Crandall, et al., 
1965; Gurin, Gurin, Lao, & Beattie, 1969; Lao, 1970). 
Nevertheless, the straightforweird interpretation of research 
findings in this area has been hampered by the frequent 
findings of sex differences in the relationship between con­
trol orientation and academic behavior. While studies have 
generally supported the correlation between intemality and 
achievement in males, the results for females have been
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inconsistent (Brown & Strickland, 1972; Chance, cited in 
Rotter, Chance & Phares, 1972; Crandall, Katkovsky & Pres­
ton, 1962; Nowicki & Walker, 1973). An additional ambi­
guity is introduced by the substantial representation of 
external males in university student populations studied. 
This paradoxical occurrence is explained by Rotter (1966) : 
Among college students and adults, particularly with 
males, there are more defensive externals or people 
who have arrived at an external view as a defense 
against failure but who were originally highly com­
petitive. (p. 21)
This description of the defensive extemêd. male who behaves 
as an internal in academic situations is based on the as­
sumption that, in the traditional academic setting, specific 
expectancies rather than generalized expectancies, such as 
locus of control, can be expected to play the major role.
Locus of control and instructional format. Studies 
ez^loring the possible interactions between students' locus 
of control and various instructional approaches have been 
minimal, and typically employ broad treatment conditions in­
volving many instructional attributes. The findings of two 
such studies may be summarized as follows: participation
in a personalized system of instruction course resulted in 
a change of locus of control toward intemality (Johnson & 
Croft, 1975) , and intemality was predictive of both 
achievement and participation in an unstructured intro-
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ductory psychology course (Eilersen, 1972).
Locus of control and cognition. The relationship 
between locus of control and cognitive activity has been 
extensively studied. The locus of control construct leads 
to the prediction that intemcü. individuals would be more 
active, alert, and persistent in their encounters with in­
formation. Phares (1976) indicates that this hypothesis is 
the most consistently verified of all locus of control pre­
dictions. An early study by Seeman and Evans (1962) of the 
information-seeking behavior of patients hospitalized with 
tuberculosis indicated that internals requested more in­
formation, knew more about their conditions, and expressed 
less satisfaction with the amount of information received 
from hospital staff. These findings were replicated in a 
similar study (Seeman, 1963) measuring the amount of know­
ledge concerning prison rules and regulations in an inmate 
population.
In a study by Phares (1968), internals were found to 
have greater recall of information learned to criterion one 
week previously. Several studies of attentiveness revealed 
the superiority of internals' attentiveness to task-relevant 
information (Julian & Katz, 1968; Lefcourt, Lewis, & Silver­
man, 1968). Not surprisingly, internals have often been 
shown to be more effective in the utilization of informa­
tion (DuCette & Wolk, 1973; Phares, 1968; Pines & Julian, 
cited in Pines, 1973).
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Instructional Models
An instructional model can be defined as a concrete 
representation of the cues, processes, and outcomes involved 
in a person-environment interaction. Models are frequently 
used in education to provide guidance to enable the learner 
to reproduce the behavior modeled. Instructional models 
are presented in a variety of formats including live, writ­
ten, or symbolic. The model is assumed to activate the 
learner to respond and to provide information concerning 
appropriate responses, the order in which they should occur, 
and expected outcomes.
According to Piaget (1962, 1976), imitation is inter­
nalized and leads to the development of mental images which 
are not replicas of the objects or events which they repre­
sent, but are rather general schema. Piaget carefully de­
fines the schema as the meaning, or concept, and not only 
the object/event to which it applies. The use of internal 
schema, according to Piaget, develops gradually with age. 
Internalized representation (the reconstruction of the 
image independent of, or prior to, overt performance) be­
comes possible through the transformation of the object to 
schema and subsequent storage in memory. Piaget stresses 
the importance of language in the transmission and trans­
formation (to schema) of models.
Bandura and his associates have focused their attention 
on the investigation of vicarious learning, using human
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models. Bandura (1965) cites evidence from informal obser­
vation that both live and symbolic models "are used exten­
sively in social learning to short-circuit the acquisition 
process" (P. 2}. In addition, Bandura argues that the vi­
carious learning process is essentially the same as that 
involved in any other aissociative learning, differing only 
in its employment of social cues. In summarizing a modeling 
study to test the hypothesis that symbolization (attaching 
verbal responses to the model's behavior) facilitates vicar­
ious learning, Bandura (1965) made these observations:
The degree of observational learning may also be 
partly governed by incentive-related sets which exert 
selective control over the type, intensity, and fre­
quency of observing responses. . . .  an incentive set 
may influence the amount of behavioral reproduction by 
either (1) augmenting and channeling the observing 
responses during acquisition, or (2) actuating deli­
berate, implicit rehearsal of matching responses 
immediately after exposure, (p. 12)
Bandura asserts that motivational conditions and prior 
training in discriminative observation are other subject 
variables which undoubtedly contribute to the vicarious 
learning process through their effects on attention.
Considerable evidence is provided in the research 
literature that a variety of observer characteristics, 
including personality variables, can affect the imitative
47
process, Akamatsu and Thelen (1974), in a review of the 
research literature on observer characteristics, noted that 
the state Vcuriables of competence, arousal, and anxiety had 
been shown to affect imitation consistently across studies. 
Evidence concerning the effect of trait variables such as 
dependency, authoritarianism, and the need for social ap­
proval has been inconsistent. The authors suggest that the 
nature of the imitative task involved may affect the rela­
tionship between observer characteristics and imitation 
learning.
A similar notion is Gilmore's (1968) delineation of 
subtypes of imitative learning. Of particular interest are 
two subtypes: generalized learning type and the information-
seeking type. In the generalized learning type, the learner 
assumes that rewards are contingent upon matching the be­
havior of the model irrespective of whether or not the 
model has been rewarded. Gilmore notes that a generalized 
learning style can be developed as a result of previous his­
tory of receiving reinforcements for matching a model's 
behavior. The information-seeking type of imitative learn­
ing is described by Gilmore as the imitation of a model's 
response for the purpose of gaining further information, 
comprehension, or understanding.
Locus of control and the use of models. There is a 
small body of research concerned with the relationship 
between locus of control and the vicarious learning process.
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McColley and Thelen (1975) found significant differences 
between internals' and externals' imitative response under 
conditions of rewarded versus non-rewarded models, with ex­
ternals imitating both equally and internals imitating the 
rewarded model more than the unrewarded. In addition, they 
reported a similar differential response to the perceived 
competency of the model. Primo (1973), however, in a study 
of the effects of locus of control in a vicarious learning 
situation, found that internals demonstrated "significantly 
greater attention to, awareness of, and utilization of vi­
cariously presented, task-relevant information" than did 
externals. While these studies suggest the presence of 
different imitation learning processes, the respective con­
tributions of various cognitive factors and learner char­
acteristics remain unclear.
Pines (1973) examined the performsince of internals and 
externals on a free recall memory task in the presence or 
absence of an observing audience. The externals' retention 
and covert organization of the learned material was facili­
tated by the presence of an observing audience, whereas the 
internals were benefited by having additional time available 
to organize the materials.
Several investigators have concluded that internals 
make greater use of direct opportunities to seek and process 
task-relevant information (Davis & Phares, 1967; Lefcourt & 
Winer, 1969; Phares, 1968; Seeman, 1963). A study by Pines
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and Julian (cited in Pines, 1973} indicated that externals 
and internals exhibited different levels of information- 
seeking behavior. Given tachistoscopic self-presentations 
of ambiguous photographs, internals sought less information 
the second time a photograph was presented. Externals' 
information seeking was not, however, affected by stimulus 
familiarity. Julian and Katz (1968) found that decision­
time varied as a function of task difficulty for internals, 
but not for externals.
Wolk and DuCette (1974) concluded that internals are 
more "perceptually sensitive" as a result of their finding 
that internals performed consistently better on a task that 
involved both intentional and incidental learning. In a 
second experiment designed to replicate and extend this 
finding, they found that when explicit cues were given to 
attend to the incidental learning task, which in this case 
was story content, the correlation between intentional and 
incidental performance for the external was increased and 
not significantly different from that of internals; there­
fore, "it appears that the external does not make full use 
of his attentional system until stimuli are made more sali­
ent or prominent" (p. 99).
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
the internal could be expected to utilize available oppor­
tunities to seek and process information while the external 
would be less likely to attend to or be influenced by the
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information itself and to be considerably more responsive to 
information containing social cues. These effects are best 
described by Pines (1973) as follows:
Internal control orientation is likely to be associated 
with a disposition toward information obtained through 
one's own encounters with the environment— with physi­
cal reality— while an external control orientation is 
likely to be associated with a disposition toward in­
formation derived from the evaluations of responses of 
other persons— with social reality, (p. 263)
The potential validity of such an interpretation is sug­
gested by Pines and Julian (1972) in their study of the 
effects of both task and social demands on the information 
processing activity of internals and externals. The major 
finding of this study was that externals appear more 
oriented towaurd the in^licit social requirements inherent 
in the performance situation.
Memory and Organizational Processes
The organization of material for storage in and re­
trieval. from memory amd the retention of that information 
represent two cognitive processes assumed to underlie vir­
tually all types of leauming. Lindsay and Norman (1977) 
discuss three aspects of memory: the data base (information
stored), interpretive mechauiisms which operate on the data 
base, and a monitor which guides the interpretive mechanism. 
Interpretive processes require the analysis of information
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and its implications as well 2is its subsequent organization 
for storage in the memory. Retrieval of stored information 
depends primarily upon its organization during learning and 
the depth of processing it has received. Lindsay and Norman 
suggest
the rule would appear to be that the more deeply the 
material is processed— the more effort used, the more 
processing makes use of associations between the items 
to be learned and knowledge already in the memory— the 
better will be the later retrieval of that item. (p. 355) 
Austibel (1978) outlines a theory of learning he calls 
assimilation theory. Central to this theory is the assump­
tion that meaningful learning requires the incorporation of 
new concepts and information into an existing cognitive 
framework which is hierarchically organized. The use of ad­
vance organizers (introductory material at a high level of 
generality, inclusiveness and abstraction) as a means of 
effectively influencing cognitive structures to promote 
learning and retention hcis been demonstrated (Ausubel, 1960). 
Ausubel and Fitzgerald (1962) reported that when the 
learner's ability to form discriminations was low, verb «CL 
learning and retention could be enchanced by the use of or­
ganizers to provide stable subsuming concepts relevant to 
the new information. As it is generally assumed that the 
organization of information and its storage in memory are 
processes which occur simultaneously, the utilization of
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aids which record information in a preorganized manner 
(memory/organization support) should enhance performance 
on a learning task.
Locus of control and memory/organization processes. At 
the present time there is little direct evidence concerning 
the possible relationship between locus of control and 
memory and organizational processes. The frequent findings 
of superior performance by internals in a variety of problem­
solving tasks are often interpreted in a global fashion; 
i.e., that internals "leam better" or "make more efficient 
use of avciilable information." What are not known, but are 
merely suggested in a few studies, are the specific cogni­
tive processes which might account for these differences.
Memory and covert organization of verbal material was 
studied by Pines (1973) in a test of the hypothesis that in­
ternals would exhibit greater retention and organization as 
a function of successive encounters with the learning ma­
terial and of the time available for recall. Confirming 
this hypothesis, the internals exhibited a positively accel­
erated learning curve across trials on the measure of the 
subjects' imposition of organization on the stimulus words. 
Of additional interest is the finding that the provision of 
additional amounts of recall time increased the number of 
items recalled by internals across trials, which suggests 
that internals are better able to retrieve information from 
memory, or perhaps more willing to expend the necessary
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effort for the search. The latter explanation is suggested 
by the finding that externals' recall was greatly facili­
tated by the presence of an observing audience during the 
recall period.
In a study of the differential performance of internals 
and externals in three different tasks, DuCette and Wolk 
(1973) reported that internal subjects were more accurate in 
remembering and more quickly identified the rule from an am­
biguous stimulus situation and used this rule to solve the 
problem.
Results from another area of investigation, that of 
self-evaluation and self-reinforcement, suggest a possible 
mechanism which might explain the rather consistent findings 
that externals are deficient in the use of cognitive pro­
cessing. A consistent pattern of findings has emerged which 
indicates that externals are less effective than internals 
in their use of self-reinforcement (Baron & Ganz, 1972; 
Heaton & Duerfeldt, 1973; Strickland, 1973). Phares (1971) 
reported that externals tended to reduce the reinforcement 
value of tasks following failure experiences, presumably as 
a means of avoiding negative self-evaluation.
In a study designed to examine the merit of two alter­
nate explanations for this differential self-reinforcement 
behavior, Bellack (1972) found that internals and externals 
utilized the same criterion or standard for the administra­
tion of overt self-reinforcement. Differential use of
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self-evaluation, with externals demonstrating consistently 
lower self-evaluations, was found to be responsible for 
differences in self-reinforcement. Self-evaluation was de­
fined in this study as the subject's self-reported degree of 
certainty for each response. Bellack summarized his find­
ings as follows:
This finding contributes to an emerging picture of the 
external individual as one who does not trust his own 
efforts or judgments. He believes that his behavior 
is not effective in securing reinforcement and is de­
pendent upon external input for evaluation of his be­
havior. . . .  He does not risk making strong judgments 
in the absence of such input, (p. 165)
One could further hypothesize that the external indi­
vidual, in the absence of social information, would require 
additional instances of that information before committing 
it to storage in memory. For example, in a task requiring 
the use of memory to retain and compare alternative solution 
strategies, externals should be less able than internals to 
remember which strategies previously led to failure, and 
thus to evaluate whether a given approach would ultimately 
lead to an impasse. If this is the case, then the use of 
external memory/organization supports should inçrove the 




The capacity to conceptualize, or abstract, allows the 
individual to interact economically and effectively with 
the environment. To conceptualize is to "render discrim- 
inably different things equivalent . . .  and to allow 
response to them in terms of their class membership rather 
than their uniqueness" (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1965, 
p. 1). Concepts are defined as the "abstracted and often 
cognitively structured classes of mental experiences 
learned by organisms in the course of their life history" 
(Carroll, 1964, p. 179).
Approaches to the theoretical issues involved with 
concept learning fall basically into two major divisions: 
those based in the cognitive-informational theories and 
those related to neo-behaviorism. In general, the cognitive 
theorists assert that thought is the product of inner organ­
ization and restructuring, while the neo-behaviorist views 
thought as the resultant product of previous learning in 
complex stimulus-response chains.
Concept learning in the behaviorist framework. The 
neo-behaviorist view presents a reformulation of early asso- 
ciationistic theories, based on simple stimulus-response 
mechanisms, to postulate the existence of internal stimuli 
and internal responses mediating thought. Kendler (1964) 
suggests the two theoretical approaches are not as divergent 
as they might seem and that they reflect "personal preference
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for models and language systems adopted to represent 
behavior instead of fundamental theoretical assumptions"
(p. 229). Kendler goes on to suggest that cognitive 
theory's structures, plans, and strategies can be equated 
with internal stimuli that arise from complex chains of 
stimulus-response associations.
Inquiries into the nature of concept learning from a 
behaviorist framework can be traced to Hull's (1934) de­
scription of thinking as an intervening variable in the 
stimulus-response bond. An early investigation in this 
vein was Harlow's (1959) study of monkeys' learning when 
faced with discrimination problems, which led Harlow to 
postulate the existence of learning sets; i.e., learning 
how to leam. Harlow hypothesized that all concepts evolve 
from learning set formation through the simultaneous mechan­
isms of stimulus discrimination and generalization with in­
creasingly efficient learning after extensive training on a 
wide range of problems belonging to a class.
More recent formulations of the concept learning pro­
cess using a stimulus-response paradigm include Osgood's 
(1957) verbal mediating hypothesis and the Kendlers' (1962) 
model of problem solving. Osgood's mediational hypothesis 
suggests that meaning becomes attached to verbal symbols or 
signs as a result of a two stage process based on the tradi­
tional S-R bond; the first, decoding, is the association of 
signs with representational mediators; i.e., ideas or
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interpretations. The second stage, encoding, is the asso­
ciation of mediated self-stimulation with overt responses;
i.e., the e:q)ression of ideas. The mediational hypothesis 
proposed by the Kendlers to account for the complexities 
involved in problem solving can be represented schematically 
as :
S— r* *s — R
with S = external stimulus, R = overt response, r = inplicit 
response, and s = inç>licit cue. The implicit response {which 
can be viewed as thought as the product of the stimulus) then 
serves as the cue(s) for the overt response. There is grow­
ing support within behaviorist theorizing for the notion 
that much of human behavior is controlled by stimulation en­
gendered by the individual himself and that one's own verbal 
responses are an important source of such self-stimulation 
(Michenbaum, 1975). It is well documented that the learn­
ing and transfer of concepts is facilitated by the use of 
verbal labels (Simon, cited in Wallace, 1967; Albert & 
Ehrenfreund, 1951; Freedman & Mednick, 1958).
Concept learning from a cognitive-informational theory 
perspective. Cognitive theories of learning focus on the 
inner mentaü. states of the individual, with these states 
variously defined as cognitive structures (Ausubel, 1967), 
strategies (Bruner, et al., 1956), cognitive styles (Kagan, 
Rosman, Day, & Phillips, 1964), and images (Miller, Pribam,
& Galanter, 1967). The notion of organized internal
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hierarchies involving subordinate and superordinate concep­
tions occupies a central role in all cognitive theories.
The use of computers to simulate the operations of human 
thought, especially problem solving, and the development of 
information theory as a means of expladjiing the processing 
and storage of information have further extended the contri­
butions of cognitive theory to the study of concept learning. 
Cognitive theories assume that thoughts are organized 
in the mind in a hierarchical fashion based on the level of 
their representation, with some concepts which are more 
broad and inclusive subsuming those less so via a process 
of ideational anchorages (Ausubel, Novak, & Hanesian, 1978). 
They are also concerned with the transformation of knowledge 
in the cognitive structure into action. The role of self- 
awareness in complex decision making and in learning is 
acknowledged, with the implication that conscious reflection 
upon the outcomes of actions and upon the causal links among 
acts and outcomes is of fundamental importance. The role of 
memory in thought is seen as critical. Memory is assumed to 
function in two distinct manners— as the source of data 
necessary for thought and as the source of guidance for the 
mental operations on the data (Lindsay & Norman, 1977). In­
formation processing views of concept attainment stress the 
importance of memory as the task itself is seen to strain 
the limited capacity of short term memory to carry all the 
required information at one time. Two major solutions to
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the problem created by the limitations of short term memory 
are advanced: the use of external aids (notes, sketches,
maps) to thought, and increasing the capacity and flexibil­
ity of long term memory through the use of abstraction, 
practice, and varied experience (Lindsay & Norman, 1977).
In addition, cognitive and information theories suggest 
that the learning of complex material, and especially its 
efficient learning, require the use of appropriate organi­
zation within memory and the use of efficient operations 
or protocols for utilization of information, as in problem 
solving.
Because of the centrality ascribed to concept learning 
in the cognitive-informational theories, most of the inves­
tigations of concept attainment have been guided by this 
theoretical viewpoint. Concept formation and concept at­
tainment are the two types of conceptual behavior which 
have been the focus of study. The term concept formation 
is generally reserved for the act of category formation or 
invention wherein a continuum emerges in response to speci­
fic stimuli or events, or through the combination of other 
such categories in the learner's repertoire. Concept attain­
ment refers to the search for and testing of attributes which 
distinguish between members êuid non-members of a given cate­
gory. Isaacs (1960) states that adult conceptualization 
typically involves concept attainment or the combinatorial 
form of concept formation, with concept formation appearing
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as the primary mode in infancy and early childhood. Although 
considerably more siaç>listic, this is not inconsistent with 
the Piagetian viewpoint of the evolution of concepts as 
described by Berlyne (1957).
Concept attainment can be described as the process of 
identifying attributes that are associated with two events, 
but distinguish them from a third. When a discriminable 
feature of an event is used to infer the class identity of 
another event, it is referred to as a criterial attribute.
Most concepts involve the simultaneous consideration 
of more than a single attribute, so it becomes necessary to 
distinguish between different types of concepts depending 
upon the way in which criterial attributes are combined to 
form the concept. A conjunctive concept is defined by the 
joint presence of the criterial attributes, e.g., a red 
square. A disjunctive concept is defined by its "either/or" 
quality, e.g., anything which is red or square. The rela­
tional concept is defined by a specifiable relationship 
between its attributes, e.g., having more numbers than 
letters. Obviously, the underlying rule is different for 
each ^ p e  of concept, and the ability to identify and use 
the appropriate rule in solving the concept is an important 
prerequisite for concept attcdnment.
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) describe the task 
of concept attainment as comprised of the following elements:
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1. An array of instances (exar^les and non-exaiiç>les of 
the concept) which can be characterized in terms of their 
attributes and/or the values of these attributes.
2. A tentative prediction (hypothesis) as to the 
attributes defining the concept.
3. A validation (confirming or disconfirming) of the 
hypothesis by the information contained in other instances.
4. The information provided by each hypothesis-test 
which limits the choice of criterial attributes.
5. The strategy employed to gain and retain informa­
tion in memory.
6. The payoff, or consequences, of the decision re­
garding the nature of the concept.
Concept attainment tasks generally fall into two types 
of categories— those which require the use of selection 
strategies and those requiring reception strategies. In a 
situation where the individual is presented with a large 
array of positive and negative instances of the concept, 
the ideal strategy is one which involves the careful selec­
tion of those instances which contain the information needed 
to allow the most economical testing of attributes. More 
typical is the situation requiring the use of reception 
strategies which center upon the hypotheses formulated in 
response to a limited number of instances available for 
testing. Bruner and his colleagues described two main re­
ception strategies commonly used in concept attainment tasks
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and cited the strengths and weaknesses of each. Knowledge 
of these strategies allows the explication of the learner's 
thought processes as he encounters negative and positive 
instances of the concept.
In the scanning strategy the learner begins by formu­
lating an hypothesis about the nature of the concept based 
on a feature of the first example of the concept he receives. 
This hypothesis is then held until it is disconfirmed and a 
new hypothesis formulated which is consistent with the in­
formation encountered. Since the learner must notice and 
memorize all the characteristics of all previous instances 
for use when the present hypothesis fails, this strategy 
places considerable demand on his memory and inference 
capabilities.
The focusing strategy, however, makes little dememd on 
the memory. The focuser uses the first example of the con­
cept, encountered as a whole hypothesis, and changes only 
parts of this hypothesis as comparisons are made between 
this initial example (focus) and positive and negative ex- 
anples encountered.
Locus of control and concept attainment. To date, 
there has been no reported studies of the possible relation­
ship between locus of control and concept attainment. The 
several studies of reception strategies and common errors 
made in concept attainment tasks reported by Bruner, et al. 
(1956) suggest that much of the difficulty in concept
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attainment can be related to systematic behavior, which they 
call strategy error. One such error is attributed by the 
authors to the extent to which an individual is willing to 
trust and use cues as the basis for inferences about cri- 
terieil attributes;
One develops on the basis of past encounters with one's 
particular world an expectancy concerning the nature of 
classes of events. One may, by virtue of circumstances, 
develop a "gambling orientation" whereby cues tend to 
be treated as probabilistic . . . These deformations, 
though they may lead to inefficient behavior in par­
ticular problem-solving situations, may represent 
highly efficient strategies when viewed in the broader 
context of a person's normal life. (p. 240)
The authors note that the sources of these systematic re­
sponse tendencies have yet to be identified, but the con­
cept of a generalized control expectancy suggests that 
individual differences in locus of control might prove a 
fruitful area for investigation.
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Proposed Study
The first general hypothesis proposed is that individuals 
with an external locus of control are limited in their learn­
ing by their preference for social sources of information.
This hypothesis is based upon the assumption that different 
control orientations are associated with different disposi­
tions towcurd information depending upon the nature of its 
source, with externals responsive primarily to information 
containing social cues and internals utilizing all relevant 
information regardless of its source.
A second general hypothesis is that externals are de­
ficient in their ability to remember and organize informa­
tion. This suggests that the extemaü., in the absence of 
social cues, would tend to discount the value of incoming 
veridical information zmd, consequently, would require addi­
tional instances of that information before committing it to 
additional processing (organization) or storage in memory. 
Research Problem
Does a learner's locus of control interact with the 
degree of social cueing in the instructional model and with 
the supplantation of memory processes to produce differential 
performance of a concept attainment task?
Research Hypotheses
Two major research hypotheses are proposed:
1. Within conditions of instructional model type.
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internals ' perfonnêmce will exceed that of extemcü.s' 
performance under conditions without memory support 
as compared to memory support conditions. Specific 
comparisons will be made to test the following pre­
dictions :
1.1 The performance of internals is greater than 
the performance of externals under ccmditions 
of no memory support.
1.2 The performance of externals is greater than 
the performance of internals in the memory 
support condition.
2. Within conditions of memory support, the performance 
of internals will be superior to that of externals 
under the informational model as compared to the 
social model.
Specific comparisons will be made to test the 
following predictions:
2.1 The performance of intemeü.s is greater than 
the performance of externals under the in­
formational model condition.
2.2 The performance of externals is greater than 
that of internals in the social model condition.
In suxnmary, the performance of internals should exceed 
that of externals under conditions of informational model 
type and no memory support. The internal's performance 
should be hampered by social cueing and by memory support.
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The external's performance, on the other hand, should be 
significantly improved by exposure to the social model and 
by the utilization of memory si^port, reaching the level of 
the internal's performance.
Although locus of control theory and previous research 
do not allow specific predictions, the following research 
questions will be addressed:
3. Across conditions of model type and memory support, 
internals will demonstrate performance superior to 
that of externals.
4. Within conditions of locus of control, subjects 
under the social model condition will perform 
better than subjects with the informational model 





Subjects will be selected from an initial pool of 100 
female students enrolled in education courses offered by the 
University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma. Subjects will re­
ceive extra course credit for participation. Most subjects 
will be sophomores or juniors, ages approximately 18 to 20.
A single sex approach will be employed with the gender used 
determined by the availability of subjects. The use of a 
single gender sangle is necessitated by the frequent sex 
differences found on measures of control orientation and 
academic achievement (Joe, 1971; Lefcourt, 1966).
Subjects in the initial pool (N=100) will receive the 
Botter I-E Scad.e, and arrangements will be made for subjects 
scoring within the upper and lower 27% of the distribution 
to participate in the experimental sessions (Cox, 1957). 
Procedure
Prior to the experimental session, subjects will be 
dichotomized into Internal 2uid External groups on the basis 
of their scores. !5ie Botter I-E Scale will be administered 
to these subjects a second time at the beginning of the ex­
perimental session and the three subjects from each group 
who score closest to the median will be eliminated from the 
study to minimize regression effects. Forty-eight subjects, 
an equal number from each group, will serve as subjects. A 
sample size of 48 was chosen to yield a power estimate of
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.92 to detect differences of two standard deviations, with 
alpha set at .05 for the first-order interaction effect 
(Winer, 1971).
Following completion of the second administration of 
the I-E Scale, subjects will receive instruction in the use 
of negative information (information about criterial attri­
butes gained from the comparison of an example and a non­
example of the concept) in either an informational model or 
a social model format. Following the presentation, each 
subject will be asked to attempt a concept attsiinment task 
either with or without the use of memory support during task 
performance. Subjects within each level of the locus of con­
trol variable will be assigned randomly in equal numbers to 
each level of the treatment variables.
The Rotter I-E Scale
The Rotter I-E Scale (Appendix C) will be used to 
assess the control orientation of subjects. The test will 
be administered in a group setting and requires approxi­
mately 10 minutes to complete.
This scale is a 29-item measure which includes six 
filler items for the disguise of test purposes. The scale 
offers forced-choice type alternatives between internal and 
external control interpretations of various situations. An 
individual's score is the total number of external choices 
made.
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Internal consistency estimates have been reported as 
follows:
.65 - ,70 for male undergraduate psychology students 
in three sauries 
.70 - .79 for females in the same samples (Rotter, 1966)
.69 for 10th-12th graders (Franklin, 1963)
Test-retest reliability has been reported as follows:
.60 for males; .83 for females at one-month
interval for undergraduate psychology students 
.78 for male prisoners at one-month interval
(Jessor, cited in Rotter, 1966)
.49 for males; .61 for females at two-month
interval for undergraduate psychology 
students (Rotter, 1966)
Investigations regarding the relationship between locus 
of control and social desirability have resulted in contra­
dictory findings. Strickland (1965) and Tolor (1967) found 
nonsignificant correlations between the I-E Scale and the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. However, Berzins, 
Ross, and Cohen (1970) found a correlation of -.23 (p.(.05) 
between the I-E Scale and the Edwards' social desirability 
scale, and Feather (1967) reported a -.42 (p.<.01) correla­
tion with the Marlowe-Crowne Scale.
While intemality was found to be positively related to 
intelligence in Dialer's (1961) comparison of normal and men­
tally retarded children, negligible correlations have been
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reported between intelligence and locus of control measures 
in university populations.
Scheduling of Experimental Sessions
The post-test only design when involving separate and 
individual experimental sessions requires careful attention 
to the random assignment of subjects to experimental ses­
sions to minimize the possible effects of intersession his­
tory as a potential threat to internal validity. As the 
data collection in this study necessitates sessions over a 
one-week period, the influence of extraneous events remains 
a possibility. Randomization of experimental occasions is 
suggested by Cançbell and Stanley (1963) as the "optimal" 
control for this problem.
Experimental events will be assigned to experimental 
sessions, using a table of random numbers. With 24 subjects 
in each level of the blocking variable, a list containing 
the numbers from one to 24 will be generated, with each 
number appearing in the order in which it was found in the 
table. These numbers, and their corresponding experimental 
sessions, will then be assigned to treatment conditions on 
a predetermined basis with the first number on the list as­
signed to the first experimental group, cuid so on, returning 
in cyclical fcishion to the first group on the fifth numbers. 




Each stibject will be exposed to two treatment conditions 
in stepwise fashion. First, she will receive instruction in 
the use of negative information in a concept attainment task 
presented via an informational or social model.
Informational model. The subject will be asked to read 
a brief and single paper which describes the value of using 
non-exanç>les (negative information) to determine criterial 
attributes, and which provides an exançsle of the reasoning 
process in a concept attainment task. To further reduce 
social cueing, the paper will be written in the third 
person.
Social model. The subject will be asked to view a 
brief videotape of another "subject" (actually a confederate 
of the experimenter) working the same concept attainment 
task. The model "thinks out loud" the appropriate cogni­
tive strategy.
Both the informational and social models will be equated 
in terms of time available to study, content, level of ter­
minology, and the degree of preprocessing (i.e., the extent 
to which the model makes demands upon the learner to organ­
ize covertly the material presented).
Following the model presentation, the subjects will each 
be told that they are to perform a similar, but more conplex, 
concept attainment task than the one presented in the model. 
Depending upon her initial assignment, the subject is then
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placed in one of the following conditions during her per­
formance of the experimental task.
Memory support. The subject will be directed to record 
her hypotheses and inferences for each trial of the experi­
mental task on separate scoring sheets which are placed on 
a memory board in front of her, providing a cumulative record 
of previous examples and non-exas^les and her previous infer­
ences and hypotheses.
No memory support. The subject will be directed to 
record her inferences and hypotheses on separate scoring 
sheets during each trial in the series. These sheets are 
immediately placed face down, and are unavailable to the 
subject on later trials. The subject must therefore rely on 
her memory for recovering information about her reasoning on 
previous trials.
In order to avoid advance presentation of the list of 
instances ^  toto, instances for trials 2 through 18 will be 
uncovered one trial at a time by the subjects. Materials 
used in the memory support conditions are illustrated in 
Appendix D.
Levels of the memory support variable will be completely 
crossed with levels of the model type and locus of control 
variables to provide the eight treatment cells as outlined 
in the paradigm (Appendix E).
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The Experimental Task
A conjunctive concept attainment task will be used 
which requires the use of memory to retain information 
about both criterial and noncriterial attributes and the 
ability to make inferences or hypotheses correctly from the 
comparison of exan^les and non-examples (Bruner et al.,
1956; Smoke, 1933; Wickelgren & Cohen, 1962}.
The experimental task is an adaptation of the conjunc­
tive concept attainment task described by Wickelgren and 
Cohen (1962) in their study of the use of artificial memory. 
The task is to identify the correct criterial attributes, 
and thereby the concept, following the presentation of ex­
amples and non-examples of the concept, in as few trials as 
possible. The presentation will consist of numbers contain­
ing eight (8) digits with four (4) places comprising the 
criterial attributes of the concept. Each of the eight 
digits is a stimulus dimension with ten possible values, 
zero through nine. The concept will be defined so that only 
one value can be part of the concept.
The concept to be used is 6 in Place 2, 3 in Place 4,
8 in Place 5, and 6 in Place 8. The presentation schedule 
of examples is designed to allow optimal inference from a 
comparison of a given instance with the first instance, an 
example of the concept (Appendix G). Presentations may be 
categorized as either examples (positive instances) or non- 
exançles (negative instances) of the concept. Either type
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may then be further classified as containing places whose 
values remain unchanged. The correctness of hypotheses and 
inferences made from each presentation depends upon the sub­
ject's ability to: (a) retrieve previous hypotheses and in­
ferences from memory, (b) hypothesize that all unchanged 
places are probably part of the concept, (c) infer that the 
changed place between an example and a non-exarçle is part 
of the concept, when the example and non-example differ in 
only one place, and (d) infer that changed places between 
two examples of the concept are not part of the concept. 
Definitions of optimal hypotheses and inferences for each 
stimulus situation are outlined in Appendix F.
In terms of task analysis, it should be noted that the 
informational unit is the place, and to attain the concept 
the subject must acquire two chunks (Miller, 1956) of in­
formation about each place— is it part of the concept, and 
if so, what is its correct value? The subject's task is to 
discover how many places, which places, and what values in 
these places define the concept. The subject will be in­
structed to indicate the hypotheses and inferences at the 
end of each trieil. The schedule of presentation is deter­
mined in advance and will be the same for all subjects 
(Appendix 6). The concept is attainable in ten trials.
When subjects continue beyond the tenth trial, the remaining 
trials will be comprised of repeat presentations of the in­
stances given in the first ten trials.
75
The number of presentations that are necessary before 
subjects will change their hypotheses to inferences consti­
tutes a reflection of their trust in their own judgments of 
information provided.
Apparatus
The following equipment and materials will be used in 
this study: a three-page written model, a seven-minute
black and white videotape, videotape playback equipment and 
monitor, memory board, and an album-type notebook containing 
presentations of the experimental task and scoring sheets. 
Descriptions of the apparatus to be used are provided in 
Appendix D.
Measures of the Dependent Variables
Two dependent variables have been selected for inclusion 
in this study: the ability to remember, compare and utilize
information on a concept attainment task and skill in using 
information about criterial attributes correctly. These 
variables can logically be assumed to be susceptible to the 
influence of both the instructional treatment (model type) 
and provision of memory support during task performance.
Measures of the dependent variables are as follows:
1. Ability to remember, con^are and utilize informa­
tion on a concept attainment task; i.e., overall performance.
Measure: number of trials to solution
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2. Skill in using information about criterial attri­
butes correctly; i.e., use of negative information. 
Measures :
a. Number of inferences for negative instance
trials
trials
b. Number of hypotheses for negative instance
c. Number of non-utilizations of changed place 
information
d. Mean trial for making first inference for 
negative instance trial.
Data on the first three measures of skill in using 
negative information will be counted for trials 1 through 10 
only since the problem is solvable in ten trials, and data 
for further trials would be confounded by successive elimi­
nation of those who attain the concept early.
Measurement Procedure
Prior to beginning the experimental task each subject 
will receive written instructions describing the task and 
outlining the directions for use of the scoring sheets and 
memory board, if applicable. These instructions are included 
in Appendix H. Subjects are told they will be presented with 
a series of eight digit numbers, one at a time, with a state­
ment as to which are exanples and which are non-examples of 
the concept. They are instructed to record each of their 
inferences and hypotheses after each trial, and to record
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the complete concept in a separate space whenever they feel 
they know the complete concept. If they have failed to 
identify the correct concept, they are asked to continue.
If, after twenty trials the concept has not been attained, 
the subject is instructed to make a final guess and the 
task is terminated.
In an effort to measure directly information process­
ing, the experimenter manipulates the use of memory supports 
by the subjects under two experimental conditions. Subjects 
in the no support condition are directed to record their 
hypotheses and inferences on the scoring sheets after each 
trial, immediately placing them blank side up in the album. 
Having done this, they must rely on their memory for re­
covering information about previous reasoning. The subjects 
in the memory support condition are directed to record their 
responses on a scoring sheet which is then moved to the 
memory board to provide a record of previous reasoning.
The scoring sheets are collected, and responses tabulated, 
upon the termination of the experimental trials.
Design and Analysis
An e:^erimental post-test design (Car^bell & Stanley, 
1963) will be used, with 24 subjects from each control 
orientation classification randomly assigned in equal 
numbers to each of the treatment cells.
While selection of subjects was based upon their
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extremity on the locus of control measure, the use of this 
personality dimension as an independent variable, random 
assignment of subjects within blocks to experimental groups, 
and the use of a post-test only design provide control of 
statistical regression effects. The absence of a third com­
parison group representing intermediate levels of the con­
trol variable limits the overall generalizability of results 
to the total population of interest. Likewise, the use of 
female subjects, for reasons cited previously, drawn from a 
limited population (university undergraduates in education) 
further restricts the generalizability of findings. When 
viewed in the context of this study's contribution to the 
larger body of reseeurch and theory on locus of control and 
learning, these limits to external validity, although 
problematic, sure of diminished concern.
For the major hypotheses, numbers one and two, a 2 
(locus of control) x 2 (model support) x 2 (support) fixed 
effects multivariate analysis of variance will be employed 
to analyze the data, followed by individual univariate fac- 
toricü. anôü.yses of Vcuriance. The multivariate test of sig­
nificance to be used is the Wilk's Criterion. Significant 
interactions will be evaluated by means of graphs based on 
two-way summary tables. In view of the preferability of 
committing a Type I, rather than a Type II, error, the 
alpha level will be set of .05.
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Testing of hypotheses numbers 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, and 2.2 
will be accosçlished by using an individual conçarison 
technique to make comparisons among specific combinations 
of the four treatment conditions, collapsing across levels 
of the third variable.
The large number of comparisons involved mandate the 
use of a posteriori comparisons. Dunn's technique was 
selected for making comparisons between cell means. The 
Dunn's procedure offers the advantage of controlling error 
rate at the major hypothesis level without great sacrifice 
of power. Alpha per comparison is maintained at .025 by 
this procedure, with alpha per hypothesis at .05 and per 
experiment at .10.
In addition, research questions numbers 3 and 4 will 
be tested by the overall multiple analysis of variance pro­
cedure in terms of tests for main effect (locus of control) 
and a significant Model Sociality x Memory Support inter­
action, and followed by univariate analysis of variance.
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Locus of control has been related to various learning 
related behaviors. However, little research has focused on 
the relationship between locus of control and specific psy­
chological processes, such as those involved in the acquisi­
tion and performance of problem-solving skills.
This pilot study has two major purposes:
1. To provide evidence concerning the usefulness of 
the locus of control construct, cis a learned attribute, in 
the study of the effect of selected instructional character­
istics on the psychological processes involved in learning 
to perform a concept attainment task.
2. To refine instructional materials or procedures 
that would permit the researcher to explore the link between 
locus of control and the effectiveness of the selected in­
structional attributes.
Rotter Internal-External Scale
The Rotter Internal-External (I-E) Scale was chosen to 
measure the subjects' locus of control. The I-E Scale is 
easy to administer, complete, and score. It provides a 
measure of the generalized expectancy or belief that rein­
forcements are not contingent upon one's behavior or abili­
ties. Reported reliability measures for the I-E Scale have 
been reasonably consistent with stability estimates for one
94
95
to two month intervals ranging from .49 to .83 (Joe, 1974; 
Rotter, 1966). Discriminant validity estimates have indi­
cated low correlations with variables such as intelligence, 
achievement motivation, and political liberalness. Evidence 
concerning possible sex differences and correlations with 
social desirability has been contradictory.
Analysis of test-retest scores of twelve subjects in 
the pilot study was accomplished by computing a product- 
moment correlation coefficient. A reliability estimate of 
.95 for a two week interval was obtained.
Assessment and Revision of Materials and Procedures
Immediately after each experimental session, subjects 
met with the investigator for a brief interview designed to 
assess the adequacy of the materials used and the instruc­
tions given during the session. Results accon^anied by the 
questions taken from the interview schedule are summarized 
below.
"Would you please comment on the paper you read (or 
the videotape you saw)— was it clear or confusing?
Did it give you enough information? Can you suggest 
isçrovements to make it more helpful?"
Comments on the written model:
It was very clear. (n=6)
It was clear, but I wish there had been more 
exan^les. (n=2)
You should have used number concepts. (n=2)
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I thought I understood until I started the task, then 
I couldn't remember how to do it. (n=2, both externals) 
Comments on the videotape:
It was clear and helpful (n=9)
It didn’t make sense at first, but after awhile, I 
understood. (n=l)
You should have used an exangle with numbers. (n=3)
"How would you rank the videotape in terms of how social 
or personal it was . . . on a scale of 1 to 10? Did it 
seem friendly, enjoyable, relaxed?"
Number of
Responses 4 4 3 1Unsocial ------------------------------  Social
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
"How helpful were the instructions you received about 
how to do the task— did they tell you everything you 
needed to know?"
They were fine. (n=6)
I understood them when I read them, but I got 
confused later on and wasn't sure I was doing it 
right. (n=8)
They were too complicated; I had to spend too 
much time trying to figure out where to put my 
answers. (n=5)
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They told me everything, but I had trouble 
remembering it. (n=3)
I think I misunderstood them. (n=l)
"Tell me what you thought about the task itself?"
It was impossible. (n=3)
I didn't have any trouble with it. (n=2)
Numbers are awful; couldn't you use letters or 
something. I have problems with numbers. (n=ll) 
I don't see how you can remember everything 
you're supposed to. (n=4)
It was frustrating, because I felt like I had 
the answer and then I got confused. (n=3)
I wanted to quit halfway through. (n=2)
It was fun; I like puzzles. (n=2)
Why can't we look back at the numbers? (n=3)
"Did you have any problems with the sheets you had to 
write your answers on?"
No (n=13)
Yes, there was too much you had to write, and I 
had trouble deciding what goes where. (n=6)
They took too much time. (n=3)
It was frustrating not to be able to look back 
and find out where you made the mistake. (n=2)
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In addition to these appraisals ̂ the interviewer and 
subject often reviewed the records made by the subjects 
during the task, to identify other problems. Several were 
noted. Many subjects utilized both the hypothesis and in­
ference columns simultaneously, entering the appropriate 
conclusion in one column and the rest of the numbers present 
in the positive instance in the other column. This inevi­
tably led to confusion on subsequent trials when the subject 
found it difficult to make sense of the large set of numbers 
recorded. In later sessions, a verbal instruction to avoid 
this procedure was given, and few subjects were noted to 
make this error. Another difficulty which was noted was 
the reluctance of many subjects (both internals and externals) 
to record a response as CERTAIN; six subjects managed to 
identify the concept correctly without having made the pre­
vious appropriate inferences. Explicit verbal instructions 
about this procedure were added in subsequent sessions. 
Analysis of Results
The analysis of results was accon^lished by using 
separate analysis of variance for each of the five dependent 
variables. Several research hypotheses and questions which 
are to be tested in the proposed study were investigated.
Two major research hypotheses were proposed:
1. Within conditions of model type, internals' per­
formance will exceed that of externals' performance 
under conditions without memory/organization
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support as conçared to memory/organization support 
conditions. Specific conçarisons will be made to 
test the following predictions:
1.1 The performance of internals is greater under 
conditions of memory/organization support than 
under no support conditions.
1.2 The performance of externals is greater under 
conditions of memory/organization support than 
under no support.
1.3 The performance of internals is greater than 
the performance of externals under conditions 
of no memory/or gcinization support.
1.4 The performance of internals and externals is 
not significantly different in the memory/ 
organization support condition.
2. Within conditions of memory/organization support, 
the performance of internals will be superior to 
that of externals under the informational model as 
compared to the social model.
Specific con^arisons will be made to test the 
following predictions:
2.1 The performance of internals is not signifi­
cantly different under conditions of informa­
tional and social models.
2.2 The performance of externals is greater in 
the social model condition than it is in the
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informational model condition.
2.3 The performance of internals and externals is 
not significantly different in the social 
model condition.
Data from the pilot study was used to test the first 
hypothesis. This was acconçlished by comparing internals 
(n=12) and externals (n=12) who had received instructional 
models varying in the degree of social cueing presented and 
two levels of memory support (present/absent) during the 
concept attainment task.
The data analysis was accomplished by comparing the 
internals and externals on five dependent variables:
1. Ability to remember/ coup are and utilize informa­
tion on a concept attainment task; i.e., overall 
performance.
Measure: number of trials to solution
2. Skill in using information about criterial attri­
butes correctly; i.e., use of negative information. 
Measures :
a. Number of inferences for negative instance 
trials
b. Number of hypotheses for negative instance 
trials
c. Number of non-utilizations of changed place 
information




Means and Standard Deviations of the Performance 
Measures by Locus of Control
Model: Informational Social
Support: Present Absent Present Absent
Measure: Number of Trials to Solution
Internals
M 16.00 16.66 12.66 14.66
SD 4.32 4.71 2.77 4.10
Externals
M 15.66 19.00 14.33 17.60
SD 4.22 .81 4.19 .48
Measure : Number of Inferences, Negative Instance Trials
Internals
M 2.66 3.66 3.33 4.00
SD 1.69 1.24 .93 1.72
Externals
M 1.33 4.66 6.00 2.66
SD .47 .47 1.63 1.63
Measure: Number of Hypotheses, Negative Instance Trials
Internals
M 3.00 1.66 2.33 4.33






Present Absent Present Absent
Externals
M 3.66 3.66 2.66 5.00
SD 1.24 1.88 2.05 0.00
Measure: Number of Non-Utilizations
Internals
M 3.00 3.00 5.00 3.00
SD 0.00 0 .00 .99 0.00
Externals
M 2.00 1.00 1.33 1.00
SD 1.41 0.00 .81 0.00
Measure: First Negative Trial Inference
Internals
M 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
SD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Externals
M 5.33 9.00 2.00 9.33
SD 4.22 5.10 0.00 3.69
Additional analysis of the data was accomplished by visual 
inspection of graphs of the interactions.
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A series of separate one-way analyses of variance 
were used to test the major research hypotheses. The use 
of a series of tests calls for the adjustment of alpha to 
control for error experimentwise, Given the exploratory 
nature of the pilot study, however, the experimenter chose 
to set alpha at .05 for each of the five analyses to facili­
tate the location of any existing differences.
Table B
Analysis of Variance of Number 
of Trials to Solution
Source df MS F*
Locus of Control (LOC) 1 20.16 1.54
Memory/Organization Support (S) 1 32.66 2.50
Model Sociality (M) 1 24.00 1.83
LOC X  S 1 4.17 .32
LOC X  M 1 1.50 .11
M X  S 1 .67 .03
LOC X  M X  S 1 .17 .01
Within 16 13.09
♦All tests were non-significant at alpha = .05
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Table C
Analysis of Variance of Number of Inferences
Following Presentation of Negative
Instances, Trials 1-10
Source df MS F*
Locus of Control (LOC) 1 1.5 .18
Memory/Organization Support (S) 1 2.66 .32
Model Sociality (M) 1 8.16 .98
LOC X  S 1 4.17 .50
LOC X  M 1 .67 .08
M X  S 1 13.50 1.63
LOC X  M X  S 1 .67 .08
Within 16 8.28
*A11 tests were non-significant at alpha = .05
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Table D
Analysis of Variance of Numbers of Hypotheses
Following Presentation of Negative
Instances, Trials 1-10
Source df MS F*
Locus of Control (LOC) 1 8.17 1.32
Memory/Organization Support (S) 1 1.50 .24
Model Sociality (M) 1 .67 .11
LOC X  S 1 2.67 .43
LOC X  M 1 .17 .03
M X  S 1 1.50 .24
LOC X  M X  S 1 0.00 0.00
Within 16 6.17
♦All tests were non-significant at alpha = .05
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Table E
Analysis of Veuriance of Non-Utilization 
of Information, Trials 1-10
Source df MS F*
Locus of Control (LOC) 1 .17 .29
Memory/Organization Support (S) 1 1.50 2.59
Model Sociality (M) 1 0.00 0.00
LOC X  S 1 .17 .29
LOC X  M 1 .67 .39
M X  S 1 0.00 0.00
LOC X  M X S 1 .67 .39
Within 16 .58
*A11 tests were non-significant at alpha = .05
la?
Table F
Analysis of Variance of the Trial of First
Inference Following Presentation
of a Negative Instance
Source df MS F
Between
Locus of Control (LOC) 1 117.04 10.79**
Memory/Organization Support (S) 1 45.38 4.18*
Model Sociality (M) 1 5.04 .46
LOC X  S 1 45.38 4.18*
LOC X  M 1 3.38 .31
M X  S 1 5.04 .46





None of the main effects or interactions for the first 
four measures reached significance. The differences in the 
mean first trial for inferences about negative instance in­
formation were significeint for the main effects of locus of 
control (F(l,16)=10.79,p <.01) and memory organization sup­
port (F(l,16=4.18,p <.10) and the locus of control and 
memory/organization support interaction (F(l,16)=4.18,p<.10).
Additional analysis of the dependent variables was ac­
complished by visual inspection of graphs of the interaction 
effects hypothesized. Inspection of the graphs reveals that 
results, while not reaching significance on the overall F 
test, were generally in the hypothesized direction. Figures 
1 through 10 show the graphic representation of the inter­
actions of interest for the five dependent variables.
Additional analyses of the cell means were accomplished 
using a multiple t test procedure to perform seven orthog­
onal comparisons with alpha set at .05 per comparison. 
Although this procedure inflates the probability of a type 
I error over the total experiment, the desirability of 
identifying any differences between the means led to the 
selection of this alpha level.
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Figure 1
Number of Trials to Solution for Internals 






Number of subjects per group = 6
☆  • • ☆  Internals
■ ■ Externals
See Table B for analysis of variance,
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Figure 2
Number of Inferences Regarding Negative Instances,
Trials 1-10, for Internals and Externals as













Number of snbjects per group = 6
2^ • •  2;̂ Internals 
■ ■ Externals
See Table C for analysis of variance,
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Figure 3
Number of Hypotheses Regarding Negative Instances,
Trials 1-10, for Internals and Externals as








In f ormational Social
Number of subjects per group = 6
Internals 
■ ■ Externals
See Table D for analysis of variance.
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Figure 4
Number of Trials with Non-Utilization of Information 
for Internals and Externals as a 







Number of subjects per group = 6
Internals 
■----   Externals
See Table E for analysis of variance.
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Figure 5
First Trial When Inference Regarding Negative Instance 
Was Made for Internals and Externals as a 













Number of subjects per group = 6
Internals 
» ■ Externals
Ŝee Table F for analysis of variance.
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Figure 6
Number of Trials to Solution for Internals 











Number of subjects per group = 6
□ • • □ Internals 
Externals
See Table B for analysis of variance.
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Figure 7
Number of Inferences Regarding Negative Instances,
Trials 1-10, for Internals and Externals as












Number of subjects per group = 6
□ • • □ Internals 
■----■ Externals
See Table C for analysis of variance.
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Figure 8
Number of Hypotheses Regarding Negative Instances,
Trials 1-10, for Internals and Externals as











Number of subjects per group = 6
□ • • □ Internals 
Externals
See Table D for analysis of variance.
117
Figure 9
Number of Trials with Non-Utilization of Information 

















Number of subjects per group = 6
□ • • □ Internals 
Externals
See Table E for analysis of variance.
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Figure 10
First Tricü. when Inference Regarding Negative Instance







Number of subjects per group = 6
□ • • □ Internals 
■ "■ Externals
See Table F for analysis of variance.
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Table G
Performance of a Concept Attainment Task 









































































Performance of a Concept Attainment Task as a 



































































not tested for significance 
*p <.05, 1-tailed 
**p <.05, 2-tailed
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Figures 2, A, 5, and 10 suggest the possible (although 
nonsignificant in the pilot study) existence of ordinal in­
teractions as specified in the hypotheses. The possible 
disordinal interaction suggested in Figure 4, as a result 
of the increased performance of internals under the social 
model, contrary to the hypothesis, is probably explained by 
the smcü.lness of the sample and the limited range of the 
measurement scale.
The direction of the scores for both internals and ex­
ternals for non-utilization of information (Figures 4 and 9) 
are contrary to the hypotheses concerning model sociality 
and the provision of memory/organization support. It is 
likely that these reflect the small range of scores (1-4) 
for this measure, which appeared to result from the sub­
jects' tendency (often mistciken) to record something, how­
ever helpful or not it might be, on each trial. This 
problem seriously limits the utility of this measure as an 
indicator of performance.
Despite the equivalence of the performauxce of internals 
and externals on four of the five dependent variables, there 
were significant differences in performance associated with 
the various treatment conditions. The performance of in­
ternals was unaffected by social modeling, as predicted, in 
all measures excepting non-utilization. The performance of 
externals increased, as expected, in the social model con­
dition in terms of an increased number of inferences
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(t{df l,ll)=3.58,p<.05), while all other differences failed 
to reach significance. Provision of memory/organization 
support was found to increase the performance of externals 
on three measures: trials to solution (t(df 1,11)=3.96,
p<.05), non-utilization (t(df 1,11)=2.28, and mean trial of 
first inference based on negative instance information 
(t(df l,ll)=4.43,p<.05) .
Significant differences between internals and externals 
were obtained on at least one dependent variable for each 
specific prediction. The prediction that the performances 
of internals would exceed those of externals after receiv­
ing an informational model was confirmed in terms of a 
lower mean trial of first inference (t(d,22)=5.5,p<.05), 
although results on the remaining measures were not found 
to be significant. The predicted equivalence of both groups 
following presentation of a social model was not supported 
in regard to the mean number of non-utilizations (t(l,22)= 
1.85, p<.025) and the mean trial of first inference 
(t(l,22)=3.03,p (.025); significant differences were not 
found, however, on the three remaining variables.
Predictions that the performances of internals would 
exceed those of externals without the provision of memory/ 
organization support was confirmed in terms of trials to 
solution {t(l,22)=6.33,p<.05), mean trial of first infer­
ence (t(l,22)=7.10,p<.05), and the mean number of hypotheses 
formulated (t(l,22)=2.44,p<.05). The equivalence of
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internals * and externals' performance, given memory/ 
organization support, was generally confirmed by the fail­
ure to locate significant differences between the two 
groups. The earlier inferences by internals (f(1,22)=2.17, 
p<.025) contradicts this prediction.
Discussion
The pilot study revealed the need for further revision 
of the materials used to provide memory/organization support. 
On the basis of experience with the task and materials, the 
experimenter concluded that the use of conçlex paper and 
pencil materials placed excessive demands on the subjects' 
information processing and competed with the demands of the 
experimental task, increasing subjects' confusion (and 
anxiety) according to several subjects. The use of non- 
numerical instances would also seem desirable.
In spite of the small and heterogeneous sample used in 
this study, there were indications that trends may be evi­
denced in at least four of the dependent variables (trials 
to solution, number of inferences, number of hypotheses, 
and trial of first inference. As stated in the previous 
discussion of results, partial support was found for all of 
the specific comparisons, and for the major hypothesis con­
cerning an interaction between locus of control and the 
provision of memory/organization support. Although the 
analyses of variance did not provide conclusive evidence of 
the hypothesized interactions, visual inspection of the
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graphed interactions in most cases supported the predic­
tions concerning the direction in which differences would 
occur.
The results of this pilot study provide limited sup­
port for the assumption of an interaction between locus of 
control, model sociality, and the provision of memory/ 
organization support in a concept attainment task. This 
suggests that a more extensive investigation, using a larger 
sample from a homogeneous population and more powerful sta­
tistical techniques, is merited.
APPENDIX C
The Rotter Internal-External Control Scale
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THE ROTTER INTERNAL-EXTERNAL CONTROL SCALE
This is a questionnaire to find out the way in which certain 
important events in our society affect different people.
Each item consists of a pair of alternatives lettered a or b. 
Please select the one statement of each pair (and only one) 
which you more strongly believe to be the case as iar as you 
are concerned. Be sure to select the one you actually 
believe to be more true rather than the one you think you 
should choose or the one you would like to be true. This is 
a measure of personal belief; obviously, there are no right 
or wrong answers.
Your answers to the items on this inventory are to be 
recorded on a separate answer sheet which is loosely 
attached to the questionnaire. REMOVE THIS ANSWER SHEET 
NOW. Print your name and any other information requested 
by the examiner on the answer sheet, then finish reading 
these directions. Do not proceed to the questionnaire 
until you are told to do so.
Please answer these items carefully but do not spend too 
much time on any one item. Be sure to find an answer for 
every choice. Find the number of the item on the answer 
sheet and circle the letter which most closely corresponds 
to the alternative you selected as most true.
In some instances you may discover that you believe both 
statements or neither one to be true. In such cases, be 
sure to select the one which you most strongly believe to 
be the case as far as you are concerned. Also try to 
respond to each item independently when making your choice; 
do not be influenced by your previous choices.
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QUESTIONNAIRE
1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish
them too much.
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their 
parents are too easy with them.
2. a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are
partly due to bad luck, 
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they 
make.
3. a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because
people don't take enough interest in politics, 
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people 
try to prevent them.
4. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in
this world.
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes un­
recognized no matter how hard he tries.
5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is non­
sense .
b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their 
grades are influenced by accidental happenings.
6. a. Without the right breaks one cannot be cui effective
leader.
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not 
taken advantage of their opportunities.
7. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't
like you.
b. People who can't get others to like them don't under­
stand how to get along with others.
8. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one's
personality.
b. It is one's experiences in life which determine what 
they're like.
9. a. I have often found that what is going to happen will
happen.
b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me
as making a decision to take a definite course of
action.
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10. a. In the case of the well prepared student there is
rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test, 
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated 
to course work that studying is recilly useless.
11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has
little or nothing to do with it. 
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the 
right place at the right time.
12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in govern­
ment decisions, 
b. This world is run by the few people in power, and 
there is not much the little guy can do about it.
13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can
make them work, 
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because 
many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad 
fortune anyway.
14. a. There are certain people who are just no good, 
b. There is some good in everybody.
15. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing
to do with luck, 
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do 
by flipping a coin.
16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was
lucky enough to be in the right place first, 
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon 
ability; luck has little to do with it.
17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are
the victims of forces we can neither understand nor 
control.
b. By taking an active part in political and social 
affairs the people can control world events.
18. a. Most people don’t realize the extent to which their
lives are controlled by accidental happenings, 
b. There really is no such thing as "luck."
19. a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes. 
b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.
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20. a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really
likes you.
b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a 
person you are.
21. a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are
balanced by the good ones, 
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, 
ignorance, laziness, or all three.
22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political cor­
ruption.
b. It is difficult for people to have much control over 
the things politicians do in office.
23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at
the grades they give, 
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study 
cind the grades I get.
24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves
what they should do. 
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their 
jobs are.
25. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over
the things that happen to me.
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or 
luck plays an important role in my life.
26. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be
friendly.
b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please
people, if they like you, they like you.
27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school, 
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
28. a. What happens to me is my own doing.
b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over 
the direction my life is taking.
29. a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians
behave the way they do. 
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad
government on a national as well as on a local level.
APPENDIX D 
Instructional Materials and Equipment; 
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Instructional Materials and Equipment: The Pilot Study 
Materials to be Used in the Informational Model Treatment 
A two page typewritten paper will be provided to each 
subject in this condition. This paper is included in 
i^pendix I.
Materials to be Used in the Social Model Treatment
A half inch black and white videotape recording, ten 
minutes in length, of a "live" model's performance of a con­
cept attainment task will be viewed by the subjects receiving 
the social model condition (see Appendix J). Compatible 
monitor and playback equipment will be used.
Criteria for Instructional Materials to be Used
In order to provide two treatment conditions which are 
equated in eill respects excepting that which is the treatment 
variable, namely the extent of social cueing in the model 
presentation, the following criteria were established for 
the written model and the videotaped model:
Equated: level of terminology used
information provided (content) 
length of presentation (viewing time/average 
reading time) 
amount of preprocessing of information; i.e., 
preorganization of material 
Social Cueing (Present in Social Model, Absent in 
Informational Model):
emphasizes source of information is a "real"
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person
encourages identification with model 
implies social approval of effort/success at 
task
focuses on another person's thought processes 
and reactions as opposed to an abstract 
"ideal" process 
The evaluation of these materials by judges is reported 
in the Pilot Study (see i^pendix B).
The selection of a videotape format for presentation of 
the social model was selected on the basis of two considera­
tions : convenience and the need to insure consistency in
presentations across experimental occasions. It is noted, 
however, that the use of different formats (videotaped and 
written) might produce confounding effects making interpre­
tation of results difficult. Any differential effects oc­
curring as a result of the different formats could be 
attributed to such factors as learner preference for aural/ 
visual mode, reading ability, different amounts of conceptual 
organization (preprocessing) in the presentations, or time 
spent interacting with materials. As the degree of pre­
processing provided and time available have been equated by 
procedural manipulations, these factors are not of great 
concern. To the extent which one can assume that under­
graduate university students can read at the relatively 
simple level of the materials provided, reading ability can
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be ruled out as an extraneous factor. Studies of locus of 
control in learning situations have not provided support for 
the notion of differential reading ability or intelligence. 
Although no studies have been reported which provide a test 
for a possible relationship between locus of control and 
preference for mode of presentation, locus of control theory 
does not suggest such a relationship. While experimental 
constraints requiring videotape presentation of the social 
model as well as the need to utilize an informational model 
low in social cueing necessitate the use of different formats 
in this study, there is no reason to suspect effects other 
than those which are the focus of this study.
Materials to be Used in the Memory/Organization Support 
Condition
Subjects in both treatment conditions will utilize a 
specially designed notebook for receiving the presentation 
of task stimulus material and for recording their hypotheses 
and inferences. The spiral notebook, bound at the top, mea­
sures 1.1 cm X  1.4 cm. When opened it provides viewing of 
two pages simultaneously. On the top page is typed the 
cumulative list of instances for the appropriate trial, and 
on the bottom page is an easily removable scoring sheet 
(72 mm. x 72 mm.) for hypotheses and inferences and a 72 mm.
X 32 mm. frame for the indication of guesses for the total 
concept. Each page contains the trial number.
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À memory support board, constructed of heavy weight 
poster board, will be provided for subjects in the memory 
support condition. This board will measure 3 cm. x 3.75 cm. 
and will be scored into twenty sections, one for each trial. 
Each section will contain an adhesive dot to secure the 
scoring sheets removed from the notebook and placed on the 
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Individual S£ are randomly assigned to treatment 
conditions.
Ss are randomly scheduled to receive experimental 
occasions.
Ss receive experimental treatment in which an 
Informational model is provided, and a concept 
attainment post-test without memory support.
Ss receive experimental treatment in which an 
informational model is provided, and a concept 
attainment post-test with memory support provided.
Ss receive experimental treatment in which a social 
model is provided, eind a concept attainment post­
test without memory support.
Ss receive experimental treatment in which a social 
model is provided, and a concept attainment post­
test with memory support provided.
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X, - Experimental treatment in which a written 
informational model is provided.
- Experimental treatment in which a videotaped 
social model is provided.
Xg - Experimental treatment in which no memory support 
is provided.
X. - Experimental treatment in which memory support is 
provided.
M., Mj# M_, M. - Administration of concept attainment
task as a post-test.
APPENDIX F 
Correct Hypotheses and Inferences 
for Each Stimulus Situation
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Correct Hypotheses and Inferences for each Stimulus Situation
History Positive Instance Negative Instance




* Hypothesis : P is probably not 
part of concept.
Hypothesis: P 



















P is part 
of concept.
Hypothesis : P 
is probably not 
part of concept.
"Indicates that this situation never occurs.
Note: Adapted from Wickelgren, w. A., 6 Cohen, D. H. Concept attainment and
artificial Izmguage. Psychological Reports. 1962, W ,  
821. Copyright 1962 by Southerâ Universities Press. 
Reprinted by permission.
APPENDIX G 
Schedule of Instances for Trials 1 to 10
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1 76838916 + (focus) X - -
2 76837916 - PS X PS is C PI,2,3,4,6,7,8 
are not C
3 26838916 + PI X PI is not C P2,3,4,6,7,8 
are C
4 74838916 - P2 X P2 is C P3,4,6,7,8 
are not C
5 76838926 +• P7 X P7 is not C P3,4,6,8 are C
6 73818916 - P2, P4 - ignore P3,6,8 are not C
7 56838906 + PI, P7 - ignore P3,6,8 are C
3 76828916 - P4 X P4 is C P3,6,8 are not C
9 76038816 + P3, P6 X P3 S P6 not C P8 are C
10 76838913 - P8 X P8 is C« -
Concept is 6 in P2, 
Mote: Adapted from
3 in P4, 8 in PS, 6 in P8.
wickelgren, w. a ., & Cohen. 0. H. Concept attainment and 
artificial language. Psycdiologieal Reports, 1962, 10, 
320. Copyright 1962 by Southed Universities Press. 
Reprinted by permission.
APPENDIX H 
Instructions to Subjects: 
The Pilot Study
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Instructions to Subjects; The Pilot Study
1. Instructions spoken to subjects upon entering and 
being seated at a desk:
The purpose of this experiment is to examine the dif­
ferent ways in which people work a special kind of 
problem solving task called a concept attainment task. 
The first thing you will do is (read a paper/see a 
videotape) which will give you a generaüL idea about 
how to go about solving the concept attainment task.
You will be given more specific instructions just be­
fore you start the task. Before we go any further I'd 
like to remind you that I won't be able to give you any 
help or answer any questions during the experiment. 
Don't worry if everything isn't perfectly clear to you 
at first. The whole session should take about thirty 
minutes and I will be happy to answer any questions you 
have at the end of the session. Now please (read/watch) 
this and let me know when you are through, OK?
2. Instructions given after subject has completed the 
paper/videotape:
Now you are ready to begin the concept attainment task. 
Before you staurt I want to explain just how it works. 
The task is like the one you saw/read about, except it 
is more difficult. You will be shown a series of 
eight-digit numbers, like these, two at a time. The 
first one will always be am example of the concept
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marked with a plus sign. The second can either be 
another example, or not an example. If it is not an 
example, it will have a minus sign. The concept will 
be something like this:
the number 1 in place 1
the number 4 in place 3
the number 9 in place 8
So, any number which has a 1 in the first place, a 4 in
the third place, and a 9 in the eighth place would be
an example of this concept, regardless of what numbers 
were in the other places. To solve the task you must 
discover how many and which places are part of the con­
cept, but you won't know in advance how many of these 
places are important.
When you open the booklet to the first page, at the 
top you will see the first examples and non-examples. 
Conçjare them carefully, and then complete the sheet on 
the bottom page. In the row marked MAYBE, write in 
your ideas as to what numbers in which places you sus­
pect might be part of the concept. For example, if you 
think a 3 in the first place is probably part of the 
concept, your answer should look like this:
3MAYBE: —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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In the row marked CERTAIN, write in the appropriate place 
the numbers which you are sure are part of the concept;
CERTAIN : —  —  —  —  __ __ __ __
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
When you think you have had enough information and have dis­
covered the entire concept, write it in the space on the 
right side of the page and call for me to come and check it. 
If you have not guessed correctly, you will be asked to con­
tinue the task. Remember: LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK if you
don’t think you know the correct answer yet.
No Memory/Organization Support Subjects Only
When you have completed the bottom half of the page, 
remove your answer sheet from its holder and place it in the 
box in front of you. AFTER YOU HAVE PLACED THE CARD IN THE 
BOX, turn to the next page and proceed as before until you 
have guessed the concept and called for me to check it. If 
you finish the booklet before guessing the concept, write 
your best guess on the last page and call me for additional 
instructions.
Memory/Organization Support Subjects Only
When you have completed the bottom half of the page, 
remove your answer sheet from its holder and place it face 
up over the square marked with the same number on the board 
on the table. You may use this any time you wish, as it 
will help you to keep track of your hunches. If you finish
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the booklet before guessing the concept, write your best 
guess on the last page and call me for additional instruc­
tions.
All Subjects
You may keep this card in front of you while you work 
to remind you of the five steps you must follow:
1. Open booklet to page 1 and compare the numbers.
2. Record your ideas on the bottom half of the page in 
the appropriate section.
3. Remove the answer sheet and place it 
No Support Subjects: in the box;
Support Subjects: face up on the Memory Board,
4. Repeat these steps for the remaining pages or until
you've discovered the concept. As soon as you 
think you have figured out the concept, write it in 
the TOTAL CONCEPT column and call the examiner.
5. If you've finished the booklet, write your best 






Informational Model: The Pilot Study
The act of categorizing or classifying objects or events 
is thought to be one of the most basic and isçortant elements 
in human thought. Without this ability to group "things" 
that are alike together, one would not know how to respond 
to each new thing he encountered in the environment.
Consider the concept, or category, of cats. How would 
someone who had never heard of a cat leam what a cat is? 
What do all cats have in common? For example, four legs, 
whiskers, and a tail. But given this definition, how could 
one tell a cat from a dog? It too has four legs, whiskers, 
and a tail. To do this one must not only know what all cats 
have in common, but also how they differ from other four­
legged animals with whiskers and tails; e.g., a cat meows.
To summarize, the basic act of learning a concept in­
volves asking two types of questions:
If we use the symbols A and B to stand for two members 
of a class (e.g., cats), how are they alike . . . .  
what properties do they share?
Then, how are A and B different from C (things which 
aren't cats)?
One interesting finding in several studies of concept 
learning is that many people compare exan^les of the concept 
to discover their common properties, but fail to pay much 
attention to the ways in which an example differs from a 
non-example. This happens even though it is throwing away
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half of the information available.
Consider the following example; The task is to identify 
what properties determine the concept, that is, what do the 
examples have in common which distinguishes them from the 
non-examples?
If the word
PORE is an example of the concept;
PARE is not an example of the concept;
SORE is an example of the concept;
PART is not an example of the concept.
Is the word MOLE an exançle of the concept?
CLUE: The concept is defined by the joint presence of
two properties . . .  a certain letter in a cer­
tain place in the word.
YES, the word MOLE is an example of the concept. The 
concept is words that end with the letter "E" and have the 
second letter "0 ."
Here is the way that comparing examples and non-examples 






PARE (-) Since it's the only one that dif­
fers, the second letter must be 
part of the concept, and it must 
be "0 " since that's what it is in 
the example.
SORE (+) Since one example starts with an
S and one starts with a P, the
first letter can't be important 
to the concept.
PART (-) Since the last letter is different
from both of the examples (PORE 
and SORE), it must be part of 
the concept.
So, the concept is "words with 
the second letter "O" and the 
fourth letter "E". So MOLE must 
be an example of the concept.
When doing a concept learning task, it is important to 
remember to use all the information . . . from examples and 
non-examples alike.
APPENDIX J 
Videotape Script for the Social 
Model: The Pilot Study
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Videotape Script- for the Social Model: The Pilot Study
Title: Concepts
Audio Portion
(Experimenter): Christa, I'd like to start
by thanking you for agreeing to make this 
videotape about concept formation. As I 
explciined before, what we're going to do 
is have you work a very single concept 
attainment task after I've reviewed a 
few basic ideas about concepts.
Before we start. I'd like to point out a 
couple of things about concepts. First, 
forming a concept involves classifying 
things into categories based on what they 
have in common. For example, how would 
you teach a child who had never seen a 
cat what cats were? You'd probably start 
by describing the common characteristics 
or properties of cats . . . .  they are 
four-legged animals with whiskers and a 
tail. But then he sees a dog and says 
"cat." The second thing you have to do 
in learning any concept is to figure out 
how cats are different from other four­
legged animals.
Let me summarize . . .  to leam a concept 
you have to ask two kinds of questions: 
First, if you let A and B stand for ex­
amples of a concept, or members of a 
class— for example cats, in what ways 
are they alike, what properties do they 
share? But the second question is just 
as inçjortant . . .  in what ways are A 
and B different from C, that is, things 
that aren't cats? People usually pay 
close attention to how two examples are 
alike, but they often ignore the ways 
in which examples differ from non­
examples . . . .  even when it means 
they're throwing away half the 
information they need.
Now, Christa, I'm going to give you a 
simple task. Your job is to identify the 
properties which determine the concept; 
that is, what do the examples have in 

















On these cards and on the board are five 
words . . . .  two that are examples of 
the concept {they're the ones marked with 
the plus signs) and two which are not ex- 
an^leSf the ones with the minus signs.
The last word, MOLE, you have to decide 
whether or not is an example of the con­
cept. I'll give you a clue: the con­
cept is determined by the joint presence 
of two properties . . . certain letters 
in certain places in the word. Let me 
remind you to pay close attention to 
the non-examples as well as the examples. 
Why don't you think out loud while you're 













(Subject): Well, let's see . . . .  PORE
is an example but PARE isn't. Since the 
only difference between them is the 
second letter that must be important.
OK . . .  so the second letter has to be 
part of the concept and it has to be an 
"O" since that's what it is in the ex­
ample, so part of the concept must be 
words that have the second letter "0".
List of Words
Subject
The third word is SORE and it's an ex- 
an^le. What does that tell me . . . 
well, it could mean that the "O", "R", 
and "E" are inç>ortant. But it can't 
be the first letter. Hmmmmh . . . 
so far I know it has an "O" for the 
second letter and the first letter 
can't matter. Now PORT is not an 
example . . . .  this is harder.
Let's see, how is it not like PORE and 
SORE? The first and last letters are 
different, and I already know that the 
first letter isn't part of the concept 
so it must be the last letter . . . .  
it should be "E". OK, what is the 
concept . . . .  it has to be a word 
that has an "0" for the second letter 
and ends in "E", so MOLE must be an 








(E:q>eriinenter) ; Very welll MOLE is an 
example of the concept and I think you 
seemed to be using information from the 
non-examples just as well as you were 
using the examples.
Christa, thanks again for helping make 










Instructional materials and apparatus used in this 
study include a brief paper (informational model), a video­
tape (social model), and a microcomputer system for presenta­
tion of the experimental task. Materials and equipment are 
described as follows:
Informational Model; a seven-page typewritten paper 
describing an efficient cognitive strategy for concept at­
tainment and providing instructions for solving the experi­
mental task. This paper is included as Appendix L.
Social Model; a 3/4-inch black and white videotape 
recording (cassette), twelve minutes in length, of the ex­
perimenter' s instructions and a "live" model's performance 
of the experimental task. A J.V.C. 5000 playback unit with 
a Sony KU 1210 receiver housed in a carrell was used for 
viewing of the videotape. (See Appendix M for videotape 
script.)
In order to provide models varying only in the extent 
of social cueing involved in the model presentation, the ma­
terials used in the information and social models were 
equated in regard to the level of terminology used, infor­
mational content, length of presentation (average reading 
time/viewing time), and amount of preprocessing, i.e., pre­
organization, of the information presented.
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An Apple II microcomputer was used to administer the 
experimental task to subjects. The Apple II is a self- 
contained computer utilizing a microprocessor unit (large 
scale integration circuit). Special features included; a 
video display including text and color graphics, 32 bytes of 
memory (2 RAM), keyboard, audiocassette for storage of pro­
gram and data, and a rotary hand control with pushbutton for 
selection of aü-tematives. A 19-inch Sony KU 1920 receiver 
was utilized for presentation of the visual displays (see 
Figure 11). A Centronics 779 Printer was used to provide 
hard copy data on the subjects' performance.
The software utilized in this experiment consisted of 
a program (see Appendix N) which utilized a game-like format 
with presentation of stimulus items, two rows of eight 
colored dots, in the upper center of the screen. After pre­
senting the stimulus items, which are designated as either 
examples or non-examples of the concept, the computer in­
structs the subject, using text on the lower display screen, 
to "Guess, or Press P” (P for pass), as shown in Figure 12. 
Pressing P is recorded as a non-utilization of information 
and advances the subject to the next trial. To guess, the 
subject rotates the knob on the rotary hand control until 
the dot hypothesized as a criterial or non-criterial attri­
bute begins to flash off and on. The button on the control 
knob is depressed to record the selection and to advance to 
the next question.
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The computer then asks, "Is it Part of the Rule? Y or 
N." After the subject has depressed the Y or N key on the 
keyboard, "Are You Sure? Y or N" appears as the text. A 
response of Y indicates an inference (certainty) while N 
indicates an hypothesis or provisional statement. The query, 
"Are You Ready To Guess The (Total) Rule? Y or N" then ap­
pears. If the subject's response is N, the program proceeds 
to a new trial; if Y, the subject enters selections with the 
hand control. If the guess is incorrect, a new trial auto­
matically appears. Twenty trials are provided to the sub­
ject. Following the correct entry, the subject is rewarded 
with a visual display reading "YOU GOT ITli1Î Î1Î! 111ÎI" and 
a message from the examiner thanking the subject for par­
ticipating .
Subjects in the memory support condition received a 
cumulative graphic display of their previous hypotheses and 
inferences concurrently with the stimulus items (see Figure 
13). This record of earlier responses was organized in two 
sections titled "Sure" and "Not Sure." Included in each 
section were two rows of dots. The top row provided a 
visual standard and was identical to the top row of the 
stimulus item, which remained unchanged throughout the 
twenty trials. The bottom row of dots in the memory support 
section was presented in Trial 1 as eight white dots. As 
the subject selected a dot as a criterial attribute, the 
corresponding white dot automatically changed to the color
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selected. Selection of non-criterial attributes resulted in 
the elimination of that dot from the display. These changes 
occur in the section reflecting either the hypothetical or 
inferential nature of the subject's decision.
The computer provided a visual display, in alphanumeric 
format, of the subject's responses at the end of each task 
(see Figure 14). This summary of responses, which was 
stored on audiocassette for later print-out, included, on a 
trial by trial basis: trial number, stimulus items by hypo­
theses and inferences for each trial indicating whether they 
were selected as criterial or non-criterial attributes, and 
correct and incorrect guesses of the rule.
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Figure 11
Microcomputer Unit and Video Receiver 
Utilized in Experimental Task
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Figure 12
Visual Display of Initial Stimulus Items; 
No Memory Support Condition
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Figure 13









INSTRUCTIONS FOR PLAYING THE FAX GAME
The act of categorizing or classifying objects or 
events is one of the most important aspects of human thought. 
A concept refers to a category or class of things which are 
alike in some important ways.
An object cannot be a member of the category unless it 
shares with other members of that category some important 
properties— it is these shared properties which define the 
category. For example, the category "lemon" might be de­
fined by the following properties which all lemons have;
i.e., those properties which anything must have to be con­
sidered a lemon. These properties, taken as a group, can 
be called the concept rule. For the concept of "lemon" the 
rule might be; anything which is a small yellow fruit, 
which is sour and has a wrinkled peel.
The game you are going to play in a few minutes re­
quires the use of a process called concept attainment. In 
a concept attainment game the task is to figure out the rule 
(i.e., the required properties) by looking at various objects 
which either are or are not members of a class. To do this, 
one has to ask certain questions:
If two objects are both members of that class (e.g., 
lemons)— what properties do they share?
How does a member of a class (e.g., a lemon) differ
from an object that is not a member (e.g., a lime)?
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E.g., a lemon is yellow, a lime is green, so part of
the rule must be "yellow"!
One interesting finding in several studies of concept 
learning is that many people conçare exanples of the concept 
to discover their shared properties, but fail to pay much 
attention to the ways in which a member of the class differs 
from nonmembers. This happens even though it amounts to 
throwing away half of the information available.
The game you are about to play is called the FAX game. 
Please read these instructions and examples carefully so you 
understand the process. You don't need to memorize the in­
structions .
THE FAX GAl’ffi
1. FAX is played on a small computer— it looks just like a
typewriter hooked up to a television screen.
2. This game involves an imaginary class of objects, called
FAX. A FAX is a row of colored dots which has certain
colors in certain places in the row. The object of this
game is to discover, in as few trials as possible, the 
rule that determines whether or not a row of dots is a 
FAX or a non-FAX. For exançle, the rule might be:
To be a FAX, the row's first dot must be red, its 
third dot blue, and its fourth dot green.
Any row not having all of these colors in the proper 
places would be a non-FAX.
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3. The player will get 20 chances to figure out the rule; 
i.e., there are 20 rounds in this game, and at the end 
of each round he/she has a chance to guess the rule.
Here is what happens in each round:
Two rows of colored dots will appear on the TV 
screen, accompanied by either a plus (+) or minus (-) 
sign. A new set of dots will appear for each new round 
of the game. Actually, only the bottom row of dots will 
change each round, and the top row stays exactly the 
same. This way the player only has to remember the im­
portant places and not the colors while working. Remem­
ber that the sign (+ or -) refers to whether or not the 
bottom row is a FAX, because the top row is always a FAX. 
A B
O O O O F a x  O O O G F a x
O O O C Fax O O O O Non-Fax
+
In example A, both rows are FAX (i.e., they follow the 
rule) so the sign is (+). In B, the bottom row does not 
follow the rule (i.e., does not have all the properties 
of a FAX) so the sign is (-).
4. The player's first job is to compare the two rows of 
dots to decide if they tell which places are (or cannot 
be) part of the rule. That is, to select a place which 
is or is not an important property of FAX.
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5. At the bottom of the TV screen are the instructions: 
"Guess, or Press P." If the player is not ready to 
enter a guess, the "P" key on the typewriter (P is for 
PASS) should be pressed and a new round will start.
If, after seeing the two rows of dots, the player 
thinks a certain dot is part of the rule (or cannot be 
part of the rule); e.g., that the second dot must be 
yellow— the player is ready to guess. To make a guess, 
simply turn the knob on the hand control and it will 
make a dot start flashing off and on. Turn the knob 
until the dot you want to select is flashing. Then 
press the button on the hand control. Hold the button 
down for a few seconds to register your guess with the 
con^uter.
When the guess has been entered, these words will 
appear on the screen: "IS IT PART OF THE RULE? Y OR N."
If the dot you selected ^  part of the rule (i.e., a 
property all FAXs must have), then press Y (Yes) on the 
typewriter. If the dot cannot be part of the rule, 
press N (NO).
Then the following question will appear on the 
screen: "ARE YOU SURE? Y OR N." If you are certain
that your answers were correct, then press Y. If you 
think they were but aren't sure, press N.
The next question which will appear on the screen 




press N. When the player knows the whole rule, Y is 
pressed and the hand control is used as before to regis­
ter each of the dots that are part of the total rule. 
This is done by locating the first dot that is part of 
the rule by turning the knob on the hand control until 
it begins to flash and then pressing the button, then 
locating the second dot that is part of the rule and 
pressing, and so on until êü.1 the dots that are part of 
the rule have been registered. If the player has 
guessed correctly, the game will end. If not, another 
round will automatically come on the screen.
If you have not guessed the concept by the last round 
(number 20), try to guess the rule at that time.
Please call the examiner when you have finished, or if 
you have any problems with the machine.
Here is an exan^le of how four rounds of the game might 
go, and the reasoning involved:
SCREEN
GUESS OR PRESS P
DECIDE
Since it's the only one 
that differs, the second 
dot must be part of the 
rule, and it must be 
green since that's what 
it is in the FAX.
RESPONSE





IS IT PART OF 
rule? y o r N
ARE YOU SURE? 
Y OR N
ARE YOU READY 
TO GUESS THE 





GUESS OR PRESS P
Since the only differ­
ence between the FAX 
and the non-FAX is the 
last dot, part of the 
rule is a black dot in 
the last place.




IS IT PART OF 




ARE YOU READY 
TO GUESS THE 
RULE? Press N
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GUESS OR PRESS P
IS IT PART OF 
THE RULE?
ARE YOU SURE?
ARE YOU READY 
TO GUESS THE 
RULE?
Since one FAX starts with 
white and one with yellow, 
the first dot can't be 
part of the rule.









GUESS OR PRESS P
IS IT PART OF 
THE RULE?
ARE YOU SURE?
ARE YOU READY 
TO GUESS THE 
RULE?
Since the first dot is 
not part of the rule, 
it can be disregarded. 
Both rows are FAX, so 
the third place can't 
be part of the rule or 
it would have to be the 
same in both rows.
Since the first and 
third dots aren't 
part of the rule, the 
rule must be the 
second dot is green 
and the fourth dot is 
black as in the 
exanple.






Press Y. Turn 
knob to flash 
second dot, 
press button. 





Memory Support Sijbjects Only
To help players remember their previous guesses (what 
they thought important on earlier rounds) , a record of these 
guesses appears on the screen like this:




The information in A is the two rows of dots discussed 
earlier which are compared to help select in^ortant places. 
The top row of dots in both B and C are identical to the top
row in A; that is, they are FAX and they never change to
different colors. The bottom row of dots in B and C start 
out white. If the player selects a dot and presses Y to in­
dicate that it i£ part of the rule, the same dot will change
from white to the color selected, if N (not part of the 
rule) is pressed, the dot will disappear from the screen.
If Yes was pressed for "Are you sure?" this change will 
happen on the right side of the screen (labeled SURE).
By looking at B and C on the screen, the player can 
see a summary of his/her reasoning.
For example:





This tells the player that he/she is sure the fourth dot is 
black and the third dot is not part of the rule, and that 
he/she thinks that the second dot may be green and the first 
dot may not be part of the rule.
APPENDIX M 
Videotape Script Used in Social Model
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Videotape Script Used In The Social Model 
Title ; Concepts
  Audio Portion Video Portion
(Experimenter): Christa, I'd like to
start by thanking you for agreeing to 
make this videotape about concept for­
mation. As I explained before, what 
we're going to do is have you work a 
very simple concept attainment task 
after I've reviewed a few basic ideas 
about concepts.
(Subject): Fine.
The act of categorizing or classifying 
objects or events is one of the most 
important aspects of human thought. A 
concept refers to a category or class 
of things which are alike in some im­
portant ways.
For example, the category "lemon" might 
be defined by the following properties 
which all lemons have; i.e., those pro­
perties which anything must have to be 
considered a lemon. These properties 
can be called the concept rule. For 
the concept of "lemon" the rule might 
be: anything which is a small yellow
fruit, which is sour and has a wrinkled 
peel.
The game you are going to play in a few 
minutes requires the use of a process 
called concept attainment. In a con­
cept attainment game, your job is to 
figure out the rule (i.e., the required 
properties) by looking at various ob­
jects which either are or are not mem­
bers of a class. To do this, you must 
ask certain questions :
If two objects cire both members of 
that class (e.g., lemons)— what pro­








How does a member of a class (e.g., a 
lemon) differ from an object Üiat is 
not a member (e.g., a lime)?
You might decide that since a lemon 
is yellow and a lime is green, part 
of the rule must be "yellow"!
One interesting finding in several 
studies of concept learning is that 
many people compare examples of the 
concept to discover their shared pro­
perties , but don't pay much attention 
to the ways in which a member of the 
class differs from nonmembers. This 
happens even though it amounts to 
throwing away half of the information 
available.
Now, the game you are about to play is 
called the FAX game. It's set up like 
a video-game and played with this lit­
tle computer. You don't need to mem­
orize the instructions because they 
will be on the screen in front of you.
This game involves an imaginary class 
of objects, called FAX. A FAX is a 
row of colored dots which has certain 
colors in certain places in the row.
The object of this game is for you to 
discover, in as few trials as possible, 
the rule that determines whether or 
not a row of dots is a FAX or a non- 
FAX. For example, the rule might be:
To be a FAX, the row's first dot 
must be red, its third dot blue, 
and its fourth dot green.
Any row not having all of these colors 
in the proper places would be a non-FAX.
There are 20 rounds to this game, so 
you will get 20 chances to figure out 
the rule; and at the end of each 
round, you have a chance to guess the 








Two rows of colored dots like this will 
appear on the TV screen, accompanied by 
either a plus (+) or minus (-) sign. A 
new set of dots will appear for each new 
round of the game. Actually, only the 
bottom row of dots will change each 
round, and the top row stays exactly the 
same. This way the player only has to 
remember the important places and not 
the colors while working. Remember that 
the sign (+ or -) refers to whether or 
not the bottom row is a FAX, because the 
top row is always a FAX.
In this example, both rows are FAX (they 
follow the rule) so the sign is (+).
Now, in this example, the bottom row 
does not follow the rule because it does 
not have all the properties of a FAX, so 
the sign is (-).
Your first job is to compare the two 
rows of dots on the screen to decide 
if they tell which places must be or 
cannot be part of the rule.
At the bottom of the TV screen are the 
instructions; "Guess, or Press P."
If you don't want to make a guess, 
press the "P" key on the typewriter 
(P is for PASS) and a new round will 
start.
If, after seeing the two rows of dots, 
you think a certain dot is part of the 
rule (or cannot be part of the rule); 
e.g., that the second dot must be yel­
low— you are ready to guess. To make 
a guess, you simply turn the knob on 
the hand control and it will make a 
dot start flashing off and on. Turn 
the knob until the dot you want to 
select is flashing. Then press this 
button on the hand control.
When your guess has been entered, 
these words will appear on the screen:
If the dot you selected is part of the 
rule (i.e., a property alT FAXs must 
have), then press Y (YES) on the type­
writer. If the dot cannot be part of 
the rule, press N (NO).
O O O O  Fax 
O 0̂ 0 O Fax
O O O O  Fax 
O O O #  Non-Fax
Experimenter and 
Subject
Guess, or Press P
Experimenter
Is it part of the 
rule? Y or N
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Now see what happens! It asks: "ABE
YOU SURE? If you are certain that 
your answers were correct, then press 
Y. If you think they were but aren't 
sure, press N.
The next question which will appear 
on the screen is: "ARE YOU READY TO
GUESS THE RULE?"
Are you sure? 
Y or N
Are you ready to 
guess the rule?
Y or N
When you think you know the whole 
rule, use the hand control just like 
before to enter each of the dots 




Now, Christa, if you don't mind. I'd 
like for you to try it. Please think 
out loud for us while you work.
(Subject): OK.
(Subject): Let me see . . . since
it's the only one that differs, the 
second dot would have to be part of 
the rule, and I think it must be 
green since that's what it is in
the FAX. What do I do now to enter
my guess?
(Experimenter): You turn the knob
till the second dot flashes, then 
press this button.
(Subject): Like this? OK
Is it part of the rule? I said yes, 
so now I press Y.
(Experimenter): Good.
(Subject): I'm pretty sure, so I
press Y.
Heaven's no. I'm not ready to 
guess yet. So, N.
o ® ® • o©@#
Guess or Press P
Is it part of the 
rule? Y or N?
Experimenter and 
Subject




(Experimenter); So now you've got a 
second round on the screen. What do 
these tell you?
(Subject) : Well, since the onZ.y dif­
ference between the FAX and the non- 
FAX is the last dot. I'd have to say 
that part of the rule is that there 
has to be a black dot in the last 
place.
So, I'll turn the knob to the fourth 
dot and press the button. Yes, it 
must be part of the rule. Yes, I'm 
sure, but No, I'm not ready to guess 
the rule yet.
OK . . . round three. Well, this is 
different since I have two rows which 
are both FAX. The first dot can't be 
part of the rule or they both couldn't 
be FAX, since one is white and one is
yellow. So . . . No . . . Yes . . .
No, and No, I'm not ready to guess.
(Experimenter); All right, Christa,
I think this is the last round,
(Subject): Well, I've already de­
cided that the first dot cannot be 
part of the rule, so I can disregard
it. Both rows of dots are FAX, so
the third place can't be part of the 
rule or it would have to be the same 
in both rows. So, the third place 
is not part of the rule.
So, I press N for not part of the 
rule. And Y because I am sure.
Experimenter and 
Subject
Guess or Press P
Experimenter and 
Subject
o  #  ®
4-
Guess or Press P
Experimenter and 
Subject
O  #  ®
4-
Guess or Press P
Is it part of the 
rule? Y or N
I think that I'm ready to guess.
Let me try the second dot and the 
fourth dot. Since the first and 
third dots are not part of the rule, 
the rule has to be the second dot 
is green and the fourth dot is black.
Subject
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(Experimenter); OK. Then turn the Experimenter and
knob and press the button for each Subject
one that you think is part of the 
rule.
(Experimenter); Well, you were abso­
lutely right, and in the minimum 
number of tricils. Christa, let me 
thank you again for helping to make 
this videotape.




The Experimental Task; Computer 
Program in Integer Basic
List




4 REM * PROGRAMMED BY *
5 REM * SHAWN MIKITEN *
6 REM * OF *
7 REM * COMPU*SCIENCE *
8 REM * SAN ANTONIO,TEX*
9 REM * 5/79 *
10 REM * *
11 REM ******************
18 CALL -936: GOTO 50
20 K= PEEK (-16384): IF K>127 THEN RETURN : GOTO 20
21 PRINT "INSERT DATA TAPE AND PRESS PLAY/RECORD": INPUT "AND 
HIT RETURN", B$:CM= PEEK (204) + PEEK (205)*256
22 A=CM-LM: POKE 60,4: POKE 61,8: POKE 62,5: POKE 63,8: CALL - 
307
23 POKE 60,LM MOD 256: POKE 61,LM/256: POKE 62,CM MOD 256:
POKE 63,CM/256: CALL -307
24 PRINT "DATA TABLE SAVED": RETURN
25 PRINT "INSERT DATA TAPE AND REWIND.": PRINT "PRESS PLAY"; : 
INPUT "THEN HIT RETURN",B$
26 POKE 60,4: POKE 61,8: POKE 62,5: POKE 63,8: CALL -259
27 IF A70 THEN 29:P=LM+A: IF P>HM THEN 29:CM=P: POKE 60,LM 
MOD 256: POKE 61,LM/256: POKE 62,CM MOD 256: POKE 63,CM/256; 
CALL -259
28 PRINT "DATA READ IN": RETURN
29 PRINT "*** TOO MUCH DATA BASE***": RETURN
50 POKE -16368,0: FOR 1=1 TO 170:S(I)=-l:NS(I)=-l: NEXT I:
FOR 1=1 TO 20:G(I)=0: NEXT I
51 FOR 1=1 TO 20:Z(I)=0: NEXT I
52 CALL -936: PRINT "DO YOU WISH TO INPUT DATA FROM TAPE?"
53 X= PEEK (-16384): IF X>127 THEN 54: GOTO 53
54 POKE -16368,0: IF X=217 THEN GOSUB 25
55 IF X=217 THEN 810
56 POKE -16368,0: CALL -936: PRINT "WHICH OPTION A,B OR C?"
57 X= PEEK (-16384): IF X>127 THEN 58: GOTO 57
58 IF X=193 THEN FLAG =0
59 IF X=194 THEN FLAG =1

























290 GR ; IF FLAG=1 THEN 300
291 CALL -936: POKE 34,21: TAB 5: PRINT "NOT SURE"
300 FOR 1=2 TO 16 STEP 2: C0L0R=R(I/2): PLOT 1+10,3
301 IF FLAG=1 THEN 304
302 PLOT 1,17
303 PLOT 1+20,17
304 NEXT I 
320 COLOR =2
330 VLIN 1,12 AT 9: VLIN 1,12 AT 29: HLIN 10,28 AT 1: HLIN 
10,28 AT 12; VLIN 13,29 AT 19
331 IF FLAG=1 THEN 340: C0L0R=15





380 FOR 1=1 TO 8:T(I)=R(I): NEXT I
390 FOR J=1 TO 8
400 COLOR=R(J): PLOT L,3
410 GOSUB 200+S




460 POKE -16368,0469 COLOR=0: FOR 1=18 TO 20: VLIN 8,10 AT I: NEXT I
470 IF R$(S1+1,S1+1)="+" THEN 476
471 C0L0R=12: HLIN 18,20 AT 9: GOTO 480
476 C0L0R=12: HLIN 18,20 AT 9: VLIN 8,10 AT 19
480 CALL -936: VTAB 23: PRINT "GUESS, OR PRESS";
481 POKE 50,63: PRINT "P";: POKE 50,255: PRINT " FOR TEST # 
Sl+2




520 COLOR=0; PLOT X+10,3
530 FOR D=1 TO 100; NEXT D
540 C0L0R=R(J+X1): PLOT X+10,3
550 FOR D=1 TO 100: NEXT D
560 IF PEEK (-16384)=208 THEN 710
570 IF PEEK (-16387)>127 THEN 575: GOTO 490
575 IF Fl=l THEN 670
576 POKE -16368,0: CALL -936: VTAB 24: TAB 5: PRINT "IS IT
PART OF THE RULE?";: POKE 50,63: PRINT "Y OR N": POKE
50,255
577 GOSUB 20: POKE -16368,0: IF K=217 THEN 580578 Z(S1)=1
580 POKE -16368,0: CALL -936: VTAB 24: TAB 7: PRINT "ARE YOU 
SURE? PRESS Y OR N"
590 GOSUB 20: POKE -16368,0 
610 IF K=217 THEN 630
620 NS(M+X1)=R(J+X1): IF FLAG=1 THEN 640
621 IF Z(S1)=1 THEN COLOR=0
623 PLOT X,19
624 GOTO 640
630 S(M+X1)=R(J+X1): IF FLAG=1 THEN 640
631 IF Z(S1)=1 THEN COLOR=0 
633 PLOT X+20,19
640 CALL -936: VTAB 23: TAB 6: POKE 50,63: INPUT "ARE YOU
READY TO GUESS THE RULE?": POKE 50,255
641 TAB 12: PRINT "(PRESS Y OR N)": GOSUB 20
650 POKE -16368,0: IF K=206 THEN 710: COLOR=0: HLIN 12,26 
AT 6: G(S1+1)=1: FOR 1=18 TO 20: VLIN 8,10 AT I: NEXT I 
660 F1=1:F2=1:F3=0: CALL -936: VTAB 24: TAB 12: PRINT "MAKE 
YOUR GUESS": GOTO 490 
670 CALL -936:F2=F2+1
680 FOR 1=1 TO 4: IF C(I)=X THEN F3=F3+1: NEXT I
690 IF F2>4 THEN Fl=0: IF F3=4 THEN 800: IF Fl=0 THEN 370
700 FOR 1=1 TO 500: NEXT I: GOTO 490
710 S=S+l:Sl=Sl+l:Ll=Ll+2: COLOR=0: HLIN 12,26 AT 6:M=M+8 
720 IF S>8 THEN 360 
730 IF Sl=20 THEN 790 
740 GOTO 370
790 CALL -936: VTAB 23: TAB 10: PRINT "END OF TEST": GOTO 810 
800 TEXT : CALL -936:VTAB 12: TAB 10: PRINT "YOU GOT ITllîül"
810 POKE -16368,0: FOR 1=1 TO 1000: NEXT I
811 CALL -936: VTAB 11: TAB 4: PRINT "THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP" 
VTAB 14: TAB 4; PRINT "PLEASE LET ME KNOW THAT": VTAB 16: 
TAB 4: PRINT "YOU'VE FINISHED."
812 VTAB 20: TAB 15: PRINT "SHARON TURNBULL"
813 X= PEEK (-16384): IF X>127 THEN 819: GOTO 813
819 POKE -16368,0: TEXT : CALL -936: VTAB 1: INPUT "PRESS 
RETURN TO RECORD DATA", A$
820 CALL -936: VTAB 1: PRINT "EXAMPLE:";: FOR 1=1 TO 8:
PRINT R(I);: NEXT I: PRINT
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830 PRINT : PRINT "T# TEST; R(+/“) UNSURE SURE G"840 S=0:S1=1:M=1
841 REM
850 FOR 1=1 TO 8:T(I)=R(I): NEXT I
860 GOSUB 200+S: PRINT Si;: TAB 4: FOR J=1 TO 8
861 W=T(J): IF W=12 THEN W=0
862 PRINT W;: NEXT J: PRINT " R$(S1,S1);"
863 S=S+1: IF S>8 THEN S=0: FOR 1=0 TO 7 : IF NS(M+I)=-1 THEN 872
864 IF Z(S1-1)=1 THEN 873
871 PRINT NS(M+I);: GOTO 874
872 PRINT GOTO 874
873 PRINT
874 NEXT I
875 PRINT " FOR 1=0 TO 7: IF S(M+I)=-1 THEN 879
876 IF Z(S1-1)=1 THEN 878
877 PRINT S(M+I); : GOTO 880
878 PRINT GOTO 880
879 PRINT
880 NEXT I
900 PRINT " IF G(S1)=1 THEN PRINT IF G(S1)=0 THENPRINT
901 S1=S1+1: IF Sl>20 THEN 930:M=M+8: GOTO 841
902 END
910 IF PEEK (-16384)>127 THEN 910: GOTO 910 
920 POKE -16368,0
930 K= PEEK (-16384): IF K>127 THEN 931: GOTO 930
931 REM
932 GOTO 940
940 PRINT "DO YOU WISH TO SAVE DATA ONTO TAPE?": POKE -16368,0
941 X= PEEK (-16384): IF X>127 THEN 942: GOTO 941
942 POKE -16368,0: IF X=217 THEN GOSUB 21
943 POKE -16368,0: GOTO 50 
999 DIM A$(30)
1000 CALL -936: VTAB 2: TAB 7: PRINT " A B C D E F G H I J  
K L M "
1010 VTAB 4: TAB 8: PRINT "N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z"
1011 A$="ABCDEFGHIJKLM"
1020 VTAB 20: TAB 12: PRINT "GUESS OR PRESS";: POKE 50,63:
PRINT "P": POKE 50,255 
1030 X= PDL (0)/20+l 
1040 Xl=X*2+5
1050 POKE 50,63: VTAB 2: TAB XI: PRINT A$(X,X): POKE 50,255
1051 FOR T=1 TO 100: NEXT T
1053 VTAB 2; TAB XI: PRINT A$(X,X)
1054 FOR T=1 TO 100: NEXT T
1060 IF PEEK (-16287)>127 THEN 1080
1075 GOTO 10301080 VTAB 20: TAB 8: POKE 50,63: PRINT "IS IT PART OF THE 
RULE? Y OR N": POKE 50,255
1081 POKE -16368,0
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1090 X= PEEK (-16384); IF X>127 THEN 1091: GOTO 1090
1091 VTAB 20: PRINT "
1100 VTAB 20: TAB 12: PRINT "ARE YOU SURE? Y OR N"
1110 POKE -16368,0
1120 X= PEEK (-16384): IF X>127 THEN 1130: GOTO 1120
1130 VTAB 20: TAB 1: PRINT "ARE YOU READY TO GUESS THE RULE?";
POKE 50,63: PRINT "Y OR N": POKE 50,255 
1140 POKE -16368,0
1150 X= PEEK (-16384): IF X>127 THEN 1160: GOTO 1150 
1160 GOTO 56
APPENDIX O 




F Values Derived from Wilk's Criterion
Source F df P
Locus of Control 3.42 5,36 .02
Social Cueing 0.73 5,36 .61
Memory Support 1.02 5,36 .42
Locus of Control x 
Social Cueing 2.47 5,36 .0507
Locus of Control x 
Memory Support 1.16 5,36 .35
Social Cueing x 
Memory Support 0.89 5,36 .50
Locus of Control x 
Social Cueing x 
Memory Support 1.45 5,36 .23
APPENDIX P 




Analysis of Variance of the Effects of Locus of Control, 
Social Cueingr and Memory Support on 
Trials to Solution
Source MS F
Locus of Control (IE) 1 4.69 .25
Social Cueing (SC) 1 0.02 .01
Memory Support (MS) 1 6.02 .32
IE X  SC 1 157.69 8.48**
IE X  MS 1 0.52 .03
SC X  MS 1 1.02 .05





analysis of Variance of the Effects of Locus of Control,
Social Cueing, 
Number
and Memory Support on 
of Hypotheses
Source M MS F
Locus of Control (IE) 1 22.69 10.75**
Social Cueing (SC) 1 0.19 0.09
Memory Support (MS) 1 0.52 .25
IE X  SC 1 6.02 2.85
IE X  MS 1 2.52 1.19
SC X  MS 1 4.69 2.22






Ancilysis of Variêince of the Effects of Locus of Control, 
Social Cueing, and Memory Support on 
Number of Inferences
Source df MS F
Locus of Control (IE) 1 11.02 4.61*
Social Cueing (SC) 1 .02 0.01
Memory Support (MS) 1 3.52 1.47
IE X SC 1 2.52 1.05
IE X  MS 1 1.69 0.71
SC X  MS 1 2.52 1.06





Analysis of Variance of the Effects of Locus of Control, 
Social Cueing, and Memory Support on 
Number of Non-Utilization Trials
Source âf MS F
Locus of Control (IE) 1 3.52 1.95
Social Cueing (SC) 1 2.59 2.59
Memory Support (MS) 1 0.52 2.88
IE X SC 1 0.19 0.10
IE X  MS 1 3.52 1.95
SC X  MS 1 1.02 0.56





Analysis of Variance of the Effects of Locus of Control, 
Social Cueing, and Memory Support on First Trial 
When Inference Was Made
Source Éi MS F
Locus of Control (IE) 1 17.50 3.27
SocisJ. Cueing (SC) 1 0.52 0.10
Memory Support (MS) 1 1.69 0.31
IE X  SC 1 9.1875 1.71
IE X  MS 1 0.02 0.00
SC X  MS 1 0.52 .10
IE X  SC X  MS 1 0.52 .10
Within 40 5.36
APPENDIX Q 




Comparisons of the Performance of Internal and
External Groups Receiving the Social Model
Variable ÊË MS F
Trials to Solution 1,40 107.84 18.60 5.60*
Number of Inferences 1,40 12.04 2.39 5.04
Number of Hypotheses 1,40 35.95 2.11 12.30**
First Trial Inference 1,40 19.77 5.31 3.73




Comparisons of the Performance of Internal and
External Groups Receiving the Informational
Model
Variable df SS MSW F
Trials to Sôlution 1,40 54.73 18.60 2.89
Number of Inferences 1,40 1.49 2.39 0.62
Number of Hypotheses 1,40 2.64 2.11 1.25
First Trial Inference 1,40 0.67 5.31 0.13
Non-Utili 2 ations 1,40 1.03 1.81 0.57
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Table Q
Con^arisons of the Performance of Internal and 
External Groups Receiving No Memory Support
Variable df SSc MSe F
Trials to Solution 1,40 4.162 18.60 0.22
Number of Inferences 1,40 3.09 2.39 0.74
Number of Hypotheses 1,40 2.01 2.11 0.95
First Trial Inference 1,40 0.59 5.31 0.11
Non-Utilizations 1,40 0.00 1.81 0.00
Table R
Gbmparisons of the Performance of Internal and
External Groups Receiving Memory Support
Variable SSc MSw F
Trials to Solution 1,40 1.03 18.60 .055
Number of Inferences 1,40 10.64 2.39 4.45
Number of Hypotheses 1,40 20.10 2.11 9.52**
First Trial Inference 1,40 8.10 5.31 1.53
Non-Utilizations 1,40 6.94 1.81 3.836
**E<.01
APPENDIX R 
Graphic Representation of Cell Means
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Figure 15
Number of Trials to Solution for Internals 








Number of subjects per group = 12
□  Internals 
# Externals
See Table J for analysis of variance.
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Figure 16
Number of Inferences Regarding Negative Instances,
Trials 1-10, for Internals and Externals as











Number of subjects per group = 12
□internals 
# Externals
See Table K for analysis of variance.
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Figure 17
Number of Hypotheses Regarding Negative Instances,
Trials 1-10, for Internals and Externals as












Number of subjects per group = 12
□  Internals 
# Externals
Ŝee Table L for analysis of variance
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Figure 18
Number of Trials with Non-Utilization of Information 

















Number of subjects per group = 12
□ Internals 
# Externals
See Table M for analysis of variance
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Figure 19
First Trial When Inference Regarding Negative Instance 







Number of subjects per group = 12
□  Internals 
• Externals
See Table N for analysis of variance.
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Figure 20
Number of Trials to Solution for Internals 








Number of subjects per group = 12
□  Internals 
• Externals
See Table J for analysis of variance
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Figure 21
Number of Inferences Regarding Negative Instances,
Trials 1-10, for Internals and Externals as











Number of subjects per group = 12
□ Internals 
# Externals
"See Table K for analysis of variance
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Figure 22
Number of Hypotheses Regarding Negative Instances,
Trials 1-10, for Internals and Externals as











Number of subjects per group = 12
□  Internals 
• Externals
See Table L for analysis of variance.
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Figure 23
Number of Trials With Non-Utilization of Information

















Number of subjects per group = 12
□ Internals 
• Externals
See Table M for analysis of variance
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Figure 24
First Trial When Inference Regarding Negative Instance













Number of subjects per group = 12
□  Internals 
• Externals
Ŝee Table N for analysis of variance
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Figure 25
Number of Trials to Solution for Internals and
































Number of Inferences Regarding Negative Instances,
Trials 1-10, for Internals and Externals as a
































Number of Hypotheses Regarding Negative Instances,
Trials 1-10, for Internals and Externals as a
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Number of Trials with Non-Utilization of Information 































First Trial When Inference Regarding Negative Instance 
Was Made for Internals and Externals as a 




































Raw Scores, by Subject, on the Rotter Internal-External 
Control Scale and the Five Dependent Variables
Variables*
# Group 1st 2nd A B C D E
1 El 5 5 5 5 0 1 0
2 £6 10 9 20 1 5 8 0
3 E4 1 1 10 5 0 1 0
4 E6 17 17 10 4 1 2 0
5 E5 11 11 20 5 5 1 5
6 E8 14 13 15 3 2 4 1
7 E7 12 12 9 5 0 1 0
8 E3 4 4 20 5 0 1 1
9 E4 7 6 16 2 2 3 1
10 E2 6 6 12 5 0 1 2
11 E7 17 17 13 5 0 1 0
12 E3 5 6 20 4 1 1 2
13 E7 15 15 10 5 0 1 0
14 E5 13 12 11 0 4 3 1
15 El 3 3 15 4 1 3 1
16 E6 16 16 11 5 0 1 0
17 E3 4 4 20 2 3 7 0
*A = number of trials to solutionB = number of inferences regarding negative instances, 
trials 1-10
C = number of hypotheses regarding negative instances, 
trials 1-10D = first trial when inference regarding negative instance 
was madeE = number of trials with non-utilization of information
215
18 E8 16 15 17 4 1 1 0
19 £4 1 1 20 5 0 1 0
20 £5 8 8 20 2 3 5 0
21 £5 9 9 13 0 5 11 0
22 £4 6 6 11 4 1 3 0
23 £5 9 9 18 5 0 1 0
24 £5 9 8 20 5 0 1 0
25 £8 10 9 11 0 5 2 0
26 £8 10 10 11 0 5 2 0
27 £2 6 6 9 5 0 1 0
28 £6 8 8 11 3 2 2 0
29 £7 9 9 9 5 0 1 0
30 £2 5 6 16 2 1 1 2
31 £1 2 2 9 5 0 1 0
32 £2 2 2 9 5 0 1 1
33 £3 3 2 20 2 3 1 0
34 £7 12 11 20 2 3 6 0
35 £8 12 12 12 3 2 1 0
36 £4 8 7 14 3 1 1 1
37 £8 11 11 9 4 1 3 0
38 £4 3 3 11 5 0 1 0
39 £1 3 3 12 5 0 1 1
40 £1 7 7 9 5 0 1 0
41 £6 14 13 20 2 3 1 1
42 £2 3 3 20 3 1 1 8
216
43 El 5 5 13 4 1 1 0
44 E6 17 17 14 4 1 3 0
45 E2 3 3 8 5 0 1 0
46 E3 7 7 9 5 0 1 0
47 E3 5 5 9 5 0 1 1
48 E7 11 12 9 5 0 0 0
El = Internals, Informational Model, No Memory Support
E2 = Internals, Informational Model, Memory Support
E3 = Internals, Social Model, No Memory Support 
E4 = Internals, Social Model, Memory Support
E5 = Externals, Informational Model, No Memory Support
E6 = Externals, Informational Model, Memory Support
E7 = Externals, Social Model, No Memory Support 
E8 = Externals, Social Model, Memory Support
